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THE MONIT PROJECT 
The MONIT1 project was endorsed by the TIP2 working party of the OECD in 
December 2002. Building on the results of the TIP project on National Innovation 
Systems (NIS), its main objective is to generate knowledge on how to improve innovation 
policy governance and create a more coherent and comprehensive innovation policy. The 
focus is on how to achieve a more horizontal innovation policy through co-ordination 
with non-core policy areas, vertical integration and coherence, and new forms of 
governance and policy making processes. More specifically it studies the foundations for 
innovation policy governance by highlighting issues such as political leadership, building 
effective co-ordination mechanisms, socio-political foundations for information exchange 
and policy learning, cultural factors in policy systems and related sources for coherent 
policy making.  
The MONIT network consists of 13 countries, all devoted to generate knowledge to be 
shared by the others. The MONIT project is organized in 3 work packages (WP):  
• WP1 consists of a broad analysis and assessment of the national policy profiles and 
challenges, as well as of key governance issues;  
• WP2 includes policy case studies in the areas of information society, sustainable 
development3, transport, and regional policy;  
• WP3 will synthesize the results from WP1 and WP2 and draw the policy 
implications. 
STEP4 is in MONIT studying the Norwegian innovation policy system through several 
inter-linked studies. A main focus is to better understand the underlying logic of the 
Norwegian system, its roots in terms of cultural traditions and the main priorities coming 
out of it. Both mapping studies and more detailed studies of parts of the innovation policy 
system are therefore covered in the project. 
 
Norway is the lead country in this network, while Austria, Finland and Netherlands are 
co-leaders. The Norwegian part of the project is commissioned by the Research Council of 
Norway (RCN), and funded by this council and the ministries of Science and Education, 
Trade and Industry and Regional Affairs. The project also consists of a learning arena 
organized by the users through which results and perspectives generated by MONIT is 
disseminated and discussed.  
 
 
Svend Otto Remøe 
Project responsible 
 
                                              
1 Monitoring and Implementing Horizontal Innovation Policy 
2 Working Party on Technology and Innovation Policy 
3 The concern of ProSus’ contribution 
4 Center for Innovation Research 
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SUMMARY  
This MONIT report describes and analyses integration of environmental and innovation policies 
in Norway. The notion of environmental policy integration (EPI) is taken as point of departure. EPI 
was one of the most important policy references to emerge from the process following the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 – the UNCED process – on how to 
achieve a sustainable development. EPI implies the incorporation of environmental objectives into 
all stages of policy making in non-environmental policy sectors, with a specific recognition of 
environmental objectives as a guiding principle for the planning and execution of policy. In the 
current report EPI is used to clarify “policy coherence” – a central concern in the MONIT project. 
In order for the reader to better comprehend the current status of public environmental 
governance in Norway, the first part of the report presents Norwegian environmental politics, the 
National Action Plan for Sustainable Development (NA21) and two efforts of environmental policy 
integration: the Norwegian Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS) and the Environmental 
Profile of the State Budget.  
The second part of the report discusses to what extent green innovation is reflected in the 
formulation and implementation of Norwegian environmental and innovation policies. The issue is 
discussed in accordance with both the horizontal and vertical dimension of environmental policy 
integration. White papers, parliamentary bills and action plans from the Ministry of Environment 
(MoE) and Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) are presented as part of the horizontal 
dimension. The activities and programs of directorates subject to control by MoE and MoTI are 
presented as part of the vertical dimension. 
In the third part of the report we present additional policy efforts on green innovation and two 
case studies of companies promoting green innovations. The additional policy efforts mostly refer to 
fiscal measures and the application of environmental taxes. The case studies on Shecco Technology 
and ScanWafer discuss the extent to which extent these two companies were impacted by 
environmental and innovation policies when developing their green technologies. 
In the final and concluding chapter of the report some of the findings are highlighted: The 
NEMS is a unique and innovative policy effort, but it is not fully implemented. The comprehensive 
innovation policy action plan (HIP) contains virtually no references to green innovation, 
environmental concerns or the ecological thresholds and Earth’s carrying capacity. In NA21 it is 
stated that the HIP “is consistent with NA21”, but as shown above this is not the case. Further, a 
check of the directorates and initiatives under the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry reveals almost no current activities related to green innovation. The conclusion 
is quite clear: there is at present no green innovation policy for sustainable development in Norway 
and no integration between environmental and innovation policies.  
The report then provides, in accordance with the analytical approach, policy recommendations 
along the horizontal and vertical dimensions of environmental policy integration. It calls for: 
1) A strengthening of horizontal governance: A green innovation action plan – with clear and 
consistent, goals, timetables and specific targets – coordinated by a central authority.  
2) A strengthening of vertical governance: A green innovation committee – consisting of public 
servants from relevant ministries and directorates – to coordinate all initiatives and programs 
relevant for green innovation. 
3) Facilitation of green innovation through existing sectoral policy instruments: Alter existing 
innovation-related policy instruments to increase the integration of environmental concerns into 
their daily activities. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the contract Program for Research and Documentation for a Sustainable Society 
(ProSus) at the University of Oslo signed with the Center for Innovation Research (STEP), 
ProSus was tasked with preparing: 
 
“(1) A summary description of the environmental policy trajectory in Norway, its basic 
priorities and political rationale. This part also includes descriptions of the processes, 
structures and arrangements in place for formulating and coordinating policy. 
(2) A description of the policy field according to its innovation policy functions: Which 
environmental policies and priorities build on innovation policy functions, and which 
have explicit or implicit innovation consequences?” 
 
This is related to work package (WP) 2 of the MONIT project.  
 
As to the first task above: A description of the environmental policy trajectory in 
Norway could easily produce a document beyond the relevance of the project, In the 
interest of adhering to the project’s focus, we feel that this study should be limited to 
topics that are more directly related to the major issues of concern; namely the monitoring 
and implementing horizontal innovation policy – MONIT. As we see it, there is a need to 
present findings that enable a better understanding of how environmental policy 
instruments are interacting with business and industry interests through innovation policy 
efforts. To conduct such an evaluation we have chosen to refer to environmental policy 
integration (EPI) and the benchmarks developed by Lafferty and Hovden (2003).  
More specifically, we would argue that this study should focus on the promotion of 
sustainable production and consumption. It is not possible to measure either actual 
outcomes or results. However, by mapping current public policy efforts, it should be 
possible to document the degree to which environmental and innovation policies are 
integrated. 
From a public policy point of view both environmental and innovation policies are 
easily contextualized and related to other policy arenas. Environmental policies have, or 
should have, wide implications for energy, transport and agricultural policies, while 
innovation policies have implications for regional, educational and research-oriented 
policies. Thus, it is appropriate to focus on these two policy areas in documenting policy 
integration and coherence. Still, the basic rationales of environmental and innovation 
policies have differed: Whereas innovation policies have promoted unlimited growth to 
ensure economic development, environmental policies have increasingly taken into 
account ecological limits on human activity in order to curb economic development that 
may lead to irreversible changes in global ecosystems.  
Increases in the range and scope of pollution problems, and higher societal preferences 
for environmental quality have triggered new formal and informal demands for innovation 
and technological development. This has been reflected in environmental regulations. 
Firms and innovators today make efforts to promote cleaner processes and products 
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through green innovations. But to what extent are green innovations reflected in the 
formulation and implementation of Norwegian politics? Firms pursue innovation and 
technological change both by internal motivation and competence and by external 
demands. This is done not only as a consequence of public policy requirements, but due to 
pressures from consumers and other stakeholders within and outside the value-chain of 
the business in question. This study, however, is about the role of public policy 
coordination and the interface and coherence between environmental policy and 
innovation policy in Norway. 
Drawing from ongoing strategic research and evaluations undertaken by ProSus, this 
report elaborates on the concept of environmental policy integration (EPI). In particular 
this report refers to horizontal and vertical environmental policy integration as developed 
by Lafferty and Hovden (2003) to analyze the horizontal and vertical initiatives 
undertaken by the government to promote environmentally sound innovations in 
Norway.  
Regarding the horizontal dimension (HEPI) this report discusses the general 
governmental responsibility for sustainable development and how this is coordinated with 
respect to innovation policy and green innovations. Regarding the vertical dimension 
(VEPI), this report discusses in detail efforts undertaken by the Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry aimed at contributing to the integration of 
environmental and innovation policies. In addition, this report reviews selected efforts 
undertaken by other ministries and governmental agencies, and initiatives to promote 
green technological innovations.  
Two case studies of interesting green technological innovations by Shecco 
Technologies and ScanWafer are presented. Shecco Technology promotes a heating and 
cooling technology that uses natural CO2 as propellant for mobile or residential air 
conditioners or in tap water heat pumps. More eco-efficient than conventional 
technology, Shecco-technology will replace HFCs (potent green house gases (GHGs) with 
significant global warming potential) and hence contribute significantly to decreasing 
GHG emissions. ScanWafer is a company producing multicrystalline silicone wafers for 
the solar panel industry. The industry in general has seen an annual growth of about 20 % 
during recent years. Using proprietary knowledge, ScanWafer produces silicon solar 
wafers with a world-leading sunlight-to-electricity conversion efficiency exceeding 15 %. 
The case is interesting not only because ScanWafer has been very innovative in the 
optimization of production techniques, but also because ScanWafer is a fast-growing 
Norwegian industrial company in a domestic labor market where industrial employment 
is declining.  
1.1 Analytical clarifications 
Although environmentally sound innovative efforts may not be presented as green 
initiatives, significant environmental improvements may nevertheless be achieved. An 
example is the silica wafer for solar panels produced by ScanWafer. It is marketed as a 
cost-effective alternative to other energy sources. ScanWafer’s marketing says little or 
nothing about the fact that solar panels may contribute to more eco-efficient electricity 
production. Consequently, it is important to focus on the effects rather than the intents of 
innovations. OECD emphasizes the systemic character of environmental innovations. In 
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the past, green technologies usually referred to end-of-pipe technologies, but all 
technologies can be considered green as long as they are employed to reduce 
environmental impacts. Green innovations can also occur in industries besides those 
dedicated to supplying environmentally friendly goods and services. Even structural 
changes – such as more efficient information and communication technologies – may 
generate unintentional environmental benefits. Consequently, green innovations are often 
systemic and complex because they involve many areas of knowledge and many industrial 
sectors. 
This report deals with the relationship between environmental and innovation policies 
and the extent to which there is policy coherence in the promotion of green innovations 
in Norway. Consequently, it does not primarily deal with technical features enabling 
ecological improvements, or with the impacts of such technologies. Rather it focuses on 
public policy responses. However, in the case study illustrations, certain technical features 
are referred to, in accordance with the methodological approach of the CondEcol project,6 
to illustrate environmental benefits during the life cycle of specific product innovations. 
During the 1990s there was increasing public recognition and acceptance of the fact 
that we are facing potentially irreversible environmental damage to life-support systems 
and Earth’s carrying capacity. The implication is clear. Environmental objectives – as a 
general rule – must be seen as a principal concern. Norwegian environmental policy is 
inspired by this realisation. There are ecological limits to which economic activity must be 
adapted. This stands in stark contrast to the basic reasoning of prevailing innovation 
policy priorities. Life-support systems are dependent on further economic growth and 
development. Consequently economic indicators such as increased exports, employment 
or number of patents are per definition positive proxies of successful innovation measures 
as long as development is promoted. This is often acknowledged regardless of whether the 
social changes are achieved in an ecologically sustainable way.  
This report deals with this challenge as it aims to combine studies of two policy fields 
that are conceived in very different terms by various stakeholders. While systemic 
limitations are a focal point within environmental politics for sustainable development, 
this is, in most cases, not so for innovation politics where unlimited growth is a target. As 
reflected by the general reasoning of MONIT – is it rather important to eliminate systemic 
limitations, and to open up systems horizontally to enable strengthened coherence.  
With a focus on green innovation policy, however, the systemic integrative efforts must 
consider certain environmental principles. The public policy solution lies in strengthened 
coordination between those policies promoting environmental objectives and those 
promoting innovation objectives. This report will document the extent to which such 
coordination exists in Norway, and explore the interface and character of green 
innovation policy in Norway. 
 
                                              
6 More details on the CondEcol project can be found at the following URL: 
http://www.prosus.uio.no/english/business_industry/condecol/index.htm (Accessed July 1, 2004) 
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2 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTEGRATION (EPI) – 
AN ANALYTICAL REFERENCE  
One of the most important policy references to emerge from the process following the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 – the UNCED 
process, is “environmental policy integration (EPI)”. Traditionally a particular ministry or 
agency was assigned the role of “environmental watchdog”, which involved continuous 
battles with powerful stakeholders, who perceived the ministry/agency as an adversary. 
This is also the case in Norway where the Ministry of Environment (MoE) is asked to 
coordinate the National Environmental Monitoring System7 (NEMS) as proposed in 
White Paper 56 of 1996-97 and specified in White Paper 8 of 1998-99. Nevertheless, the 
respective sectoral ministries are responsible for enforcing compliance with the 
regulations in NEMS.  
The UNCED process, however, forms the basis for an alternative, more 
complementary approach – called “ecological modernization” (Reitan 2001) – which 
argues that both environmental and developmental issues are part and parcel of 
sustainable development. This integration of environmental issues into the politics in 
general signals sustainable development’s emergence as the guiding principle for societal 
development (Lafferty and Meadowcraft 2000). As emphasized by Hovden and Torjussen 
(2002:21): “With sustainable development, environmental policy has become much more 
than pollution control and protection of nature, it has become a process of qualitative 
reappraisal of prevalent development patterns”.  
2.1 Coherence – the ultimate goal of horizontal innovation policy? 
The conceptual paper for MONIT is the source for the comments made in this section8. 
According to the conceptual paper horizontalization is not a goal in itself, but rather a 
characteristic of a policy system. It is defined as the degree to which innovation policy is 
guided by a comprehensive national strategy in which contributions from the various 
sectors are linked to achieve policy coherence. There is a crucial link between 
horizontalization and the arrangements for coordination and governance. Consequently, 
the capabilities of national policy systems to generate coherent innovation policy are of 
primary concern. Coherence is important for many reasons:9 
 
                                              
7 National Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS) is a term coined by the authors. It is a loose 
translation of the Norwegian term “resultatoppfølgingssystemet”. No official translation to English 
has been proposed by the authorities.  In White Paper 25 (2002-2003) it is only referred to as 
“monitoring the results of environmental policy” [In Norwegian: “resultatoppfølging av 
miljøvernpolitikken”]. 
8 For further details see; http://www.step.no/monit/jointpaper.pdf (Accessed May 4, 2004) 
9 The quote below is originally from an unpublished, undated, discussion paper from the Centre of 
Government Network: Government Coherence: The Role of the Centre, OECD, PUMA, provided 
by Svend Otto Remøe, the MONIT project coordinator. 
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• “Coherent policies are more likely to be effective and more readily applied in a 
consistent and equitable way; 
• Governments are increasingly faced with complex and difficult issues, which may 
impact differently on different areas of society; 
• They frequently have a range of objectives which cannot easily be reconciled and 
may be in conflict; 
• Faced with greater accountability and challenge, through parliaments, civil society 
and the media, lack of coherence becomes readily apparent and results in 
uncertainty loss of confidence.  
 
The concept has basically basically three dimensions: 
 
• Horizontal coherence, ensuring that individual, or sectoral, policies, build on each 
other and minimise inconsistencies in the case of (seemingly) conflicting goals; 
• Vertical coherence, ensuring that public outputs are consistent with the original 
intentions of policy makers; 
• Temporal coherence, ensuring that today’s policies continues to be effective in the 
future by limiting potential incoherence and providing guidance for change (and 
relate to transition management).” 
 
The MONIT study aims at generating lessons for national governments on how to 
achieve coherence in innovation policy by highlighting issues such as political leadership, 
building effective co-ordination mechanisms, socio-political foundations for information 
exchange and policy learning, cultural factors in policy systems and related sources for 
coherent policy making. As part of these efforts ProSus is analysing Norwegian 
environmental public policy and assessing to what extent it supports efforts to promote 
environmentally sound innovations. The specific question raised by ProSus, however, is: 
How can the concept “coherence” be operationalized? We refer to the concept 
‘environmental policy integration’ (EPI) as a way of specifying the horizontal, vertical and 
temporal dimensions of coherence referred to in the conceptual paper. 
2.2 Environmental Policy Integration – an effort to clarify policy 
coherence 
As an input to the MONIT project we will not engage in an open-ended discussion of 
environmental policy integration (EPI), but rather focus on the features contributing to 
more effective implementation of policies promoting green innovations.  
Ute Collier’s work on EPI is a valuable starting point for discussing the concept. She is 
one of the few who define EPI in a way that distinguishes between features of its 
application such as strategies and indicators. She offers (Colliers 1997:36) a three-point 
definition of the objective of EPI. It should aim to: 
− achieve sustainable development and prevent environmental damage 
− remove contradictions between policies as well as within policies 
− realize mutual benefits and the goal of making policies mutually supportive 
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While Collier’s definition places the concept of EPI in the right intellectual context and 
provides a number of possible indications as to what it might entail, the definition is short 
of a precise, applicable definition of EPI. In other words, as Lafferty and Hovden ask 
(2003:8): “How will we recognize it when we see it?”  
To answer this question, Lafferty and Hovden (2003) found the early work of Arild 
Underdal helpful. Even though Underdal deals with policy integration in general, his 
approach to the problem has the appealing feature of concentrating on the character of 
the policymaking process. For a policy to be ‘integrated’, three criteria need to be satisfied: 
comprehensiveness, aggregation and consistency. Underdal defines an integrated policy as 
one where: “all significant consequences of policy decisions are recognized as decision 
premises, where policy options are evaluated on the basis of the effects on some aggregate 
measures of utility, and where the different policy elements are in accordance with each 
other” (Underdal 1980 – cited in Lafferty and Hovden 2003:8). The definition proposed 
by Underdal is very well developed and precise, but it can in principle be used for any type 
of policy integration. It is not specifically tied to environmental policy and its relation to 
sustainable development. Consequently, we lack a value hierarchy to guide the actual 
integration in question.  
In accordance with the reasoning embedded in the UNCED process, but inspired by 
Underdal (1980), Lafferty and Hovden (2003:9) propose the following definition of EPI: 
Environmental policy integration implies the incorporation of environmental objectives into all stages of 
policy making in non-environmental policy sectors, with a specific recognition of this goal as a guiding 
principle for the planning and execution of policy.  
Further it is accompanied by an attempt to aggregate presumed environmental consequences into an 
overall evaluation of policy, and a commitment to minimize contradictions between environmental and 
sectoral policies by giving principled priority to the former over the latter. 
This definition of EPI specifies the integration principle in terms of policymaking and is 
primarily a process-oriented concept. Environmental objectives need to be part of the 
fundamental premises for policy-making – including innovation policies – at all stages. 
The second part of the definition refers to the crucial issue in defining EPI. Most 
discussions – including reference documents in the MONIT project, general literature on 
national innovation systems (NIS) and the reasoning of ecological modernization – 
assume that conflicting interests between policy objectives can be resolved to the 
satisfaction of all affected parties. The significance of EPI, however, refers to situations 
where environmental objectives must be assessed as potentially dominant. The increasing 
recognition and acceptance of the fact that Earth is facing potentially irreversible damage 
to life-support systems clearly implies that environmental objectives – in given 
circumstances – must be seen as principal. However, a strong presupposition in favor of 
environmental concerns vis-à-vis other sectoral concerns should not be converted to what 
Lafferty and Hovden (2003) term an ‘extra-democratic’ mandate. Political priorities must 
be agreed upon within democratic procedures. There is considerable room, however, for 
strengthening the mandate for sustainable development within the policy realm of existing 
sectoral interests. For example, the actual role, scope and significance of a national action 
plan for sustainable development could serve as a ‘touchstone’ for reconciling various 
sectoral interests.  
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Figure 1: Environmental policy integration. Horizontal and vertical dimensions (Lafferty and 
Hovden 2003: 14).  
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, EPI has horizontal and vertical dimensions. The horizontal 
dimension refers to the governmental responsibility for sustainable development and the 
overall challenge of inter-ministerial policy coordination. The vertical dimension refers to 
the particular sectoral responsibility of the individual ministry and its policy fields. EPI 
refers to the policy challenge of comprehensive coordination between the two dimensions. 
This challenge is the focus of the subsequent discussion. Clearly, a situation where 
environmental concerns have a position as central as that of financial and economic 
policy objectives is far away. However, the basic notion of EPI attempts to bring policy-
making closer to this ideal. ProSus believes this ideal is also relevant in a MONIT context 
– particularly when developing green innovation policy, but also when assessing more 
generally the impact of innovation policy. 
2.3 The horizontal dimension of EPI – HEPI 
The emphasis in this report is on the integration of environmental concerns into 
innovation policy-making as a feature of governmental steering. The approach focuses on 
processes and policies promoting green innovations, and less on the technological output 
of the government’s innovation initiatives. 
The concept of HEPI refers to whether a central authority has developed a 
comprehensive cross-sectoral strategy for EPI promoting green innovations. The central 
authority could be the government itself, or a particular body or commission entrusted 
with an overarching responsibility for sustainable development. As emphasized by Lafferty 
and Hovden (2003:14) “If ‘who gets what, where, when and how?’ is the essence of a 
political system, the relevant understanding of HEPI is to substitute ‘environmental 
interest’ for ‘who’, and to insist on at least equal treatment for the environment as for 
other competing interests”. HEPI also includes the central authority’s ability to 
communicate to the sectors a detailed understanding of what the central authority aims to 
achieve by EPI; In the case of the current report the explicit implications EPI should have 
for the specific sectoral policies related to innovation.  
Lafferty and Hovden (2003) propose the following benchmarks for horizontal 
environmental policy integration (HEPI): 
- the existence of a long term sustainable development strategy (SDS) 
Horizontal Dimension
(Governmental Responsibility for Sustainable 
Vertical Dimension 
(E.g Ministry/Dept.) 
Vertical Dimension
(E.g Ministry/Dept.)
Vertical Dimension
(E.g Ministry/Dept.)
Agriculture  Energy Transport  
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- the existence of a central authority specifically entrusted with the supervision, 
coordination and implementation of the integration process 
- relatively clear designations from central authority as to sectoral responsibility for 
overarching environmental goals 
- timetables and targets for environmental policy 
- periodic reporting of progress with respect to targets at both the central and 
sectoral levels 
- an active and monitored usage of environmental impact assessments (EIA) and 
strategic environmental assessments (SEA) for all governmental policies 
Lafferty and Hovden (2003: 15) stress the SDS as “extremely important” as “… its 
existence indicates a political commitment to the crucial role that the UNCED process 
has assigned EPI in the national policy-making context” and gives a strong indication of 
how a government relates to EPI in the overall decision-making process. Further an “SDS 
is bound to discuss matters related to economic and social development, as these are 
integral aspects of sustainable development.” Equally important, according to Lafferty and 
Hovden, “is the existence of a specific central authority, an identifiable and responsible 
institution to oversee the process of strategic integration. This is a basic realpolitik aspect 
of the horizontal dimension, in that a separate sectoral environmental body will rarely, if 
ever, have the authority necessary to impose environmental objectives into the decision-
making process of other sectoral authorities.” We will return to whether, and to what 
extent, these two most important benchmarks of HEPI, and the other benchmarks 
mentioned in the above list, exist in Norway. 
2.4 The vertical dimension of EPI – VEPI 
“Vertical EPI indicates the extent to which a particular governmental sector has taken 
on board and implemented environmental objectives as central in the portfolio of 
objectives that the sector continuously pursues (Lafferty and Hovden 2003: 12).” In other 
words, VEPI refers to a ‘greening’ of sectoral policies. As underlined by Lafferty and 
Hovden (ibid) it is important to stress that the term “vertical” is used in a functional sense, 
and not in the sense of vertical constitutional division of powers. VEPI, the vertical axis of 
EPI as illustrated in figure 1, signifies administrative responsibility up and down within 
the arena of the specific ministerial sector. 
Indicators for VEPI must refer to efforts on how a given governmental ministry aims to 
integrate environmental concerns into its activities. Lafferty and Hovden (2003) propose 
the following benchmarks: 
- an initial mapping and specification of the major environmental challenges relevant 
to the sector 
- formulation of a sectoral Environmental Action Plan 
- consistent and regular employment of both environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA) for all sectoral policy 
decisions 
- timetables and quantitative, indicator-based targets stipulated in the sectoral 
Environmental Action Plan – or elsewhere 
- regular reporting of the state of the environmentally relevant policies within the 
sector 
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The key initiative is the existence of a strategic Environmental Action Plan. However, 
the plan itself will be of limited importance if it fails to properly assess and identify the key 
environmental challenges for the sector. Further it will be of limited value if it fails to 
stipulate realistic targets, benchmarks and measures for assessment of implementation 
results concerning sectoral environmental challenges. 
2.5 Summary 
To operationalize coherence – one of the key concepts in the MONIT project – we 
have introduced EPI and discussed its horizontal and vertical dimensions. We believe EPI 
is valuable and necessary for discussing the policy trajectory of environmental politics in 
Norway. EPI will add important perspectives to the discussion of integrating 
environmental and innovation policies. 
The following definition of EPI, based on Lafferty and Hovden’s approach, is 
proposed: 
Environmental policy integration implies the incorporation of environmental 
objectives into all stages of policy making in non-environmental policy sectors, with 
a specific recognition of this goal as a guiding principle for the planning and 
execution of policy. Further it is accompanied by an attempt to aggregate presumed 
environmental consequences into an overall evaluation of policy, and a 
commitment to minimize contradictions between environmental and sectoral 
policies by giving principled priority to the former over the latter. 
This definition specifies the integration principle in terms of policy-making. The 
environmental objectives need to be part of the fundamental premises for policy-making 
at all stages – including innovation policies. This refers to both a horizontal and vertical 
dimension. The second part of the definition refers to the crucial issue in defining EPI. 
General literature on national innovation systems assumes that conflicting interests 
between policy objectives can be resolved to the satisfaction of all affected parties. The 
significance of EPI, however, refers to situations where environmental objectives warrant 
principled priority. The increasing recognition and acceptance of the fact that the world 
face potentially irreversible damage to life-support systems clearly implies that 
environmental concerns must be given preferential consideration. 
Environmental policy integration has a horizontal and vertical dimension, referred to 
as HEPI and VEPI, respectively. With respect to innovation policy, HEPI refers to 
whether central authority has developed, and carried through, cross-sectoral strategy for 
promoting green innovations. VEPI indicates the extent to which a particular 
governmental sector has taken on board and implemented environmental concerns 
within the innovation objectives for the sector. 
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3 NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND 
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 
SYSTEM10  
Norwegian environmental politics is based on the principle of sector responsibility. 
This implies that most of the political responsibility for following up general programmes 
is left to the ministries and directorates of each sector. The execution of sectoral 
responsibility may strengthen vertical integration but still hinder horizontal policy 
integration. The principle of sector responsibility was first introduced in White Paper 46 
(1988-89). It was further elaborated and formally acknowledged in White Paper 58 (1996-
97). As a follow up, the National Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS) was 
proposed in White Paper 8 of 1998-99, the first ‘State of the Environment Report’. This 
chapter describes and assesses the NEMS and the environmental profile of the State 
Budget. This chapter’s aim is to describe Norwegian environmental politics and the 
environmental monitoring system in Norway in order to set the stage for analyzing green 
innovation policy. We begin by presenting key features of Norwegian environmental 
politics.  
3.1 A brief introduction to Norwegian environmental politics 
Norwegian environmental politics as a major policy area dates back to 1972 with the 
establishment of the Ministry of Environment (MoE) – the world’s first ministry for 
environmental protection. Important subsequent developments included the 
establishment of the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) on June 1, 1974, the 
proposing of the Pollution Control Act on March 13, 1981, and its enforcement in 
October 1983. The policy formation process, general choice of instruments and mode of 
representation for interest groups were in accordance with traditional ministerial 
procedures with emphasis on technical expertise and judicial instruments – what Reitan 
(2001) terms “administrative rationalism”.  
Toward the end of the 1980s, however, new signals began to appear in the area of 
environmental politics. The report by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED 1987) and the decisions made at United Nations Conference of 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, reflected a new 
paradigm, often referred to as “ecological modernization”. Reitan (2001) describes 
ecological modernization as an anti-thesis to administrative rationalism. Whereas the 
former focuses on win-lose situations of economic growth versus environmental 
protection, and uses administrative/judicial instruments, the latter focuses on win-win 
situations and a broader range of instruments and approaches to environmental problems, 
in particular fiscal measures. The transition is also marked by a more active involvement 
of business/industry and civil society in policy formulation and implementation, with 
                                              
10 Eivind Hovden, former associate professor at ProSus, has provided substantial input to parts of 
this chapter. 
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voluntary, negotiated agreements and cooperation perceived as alternative means of 
achieving the new and broader ideal – sustainable development. 
In White Paper 46 of 1988-89 the Norwegian Government proposed to the Norwegian 
Parliament efforts to follow up the requests made by the WCED. In Chapter 10 of the 
document, several industrial policy measures were suggested. It was stated that:  
“[Industrial] changes must be adjusted to the objectives of sustainable development. There is still time. 
By initiating changes now, abrupt and more costly changes can be avoided in the future.” [Authors 
translation] (White Paper 46 (1988-89): 101)  
The government identified three strategies to make industry more environmentally 
friendly (1) changing product technologies; (2) changing production technologies; and (3) 
strengthening pollution control. White Paper 46 (1988-89) refers to strengthening 
pollution control as the most common strategy to combat hazardous industrial discharges 
into the air and water, but points out that a focus on end-of-pipe solutions does not 
eliminate the sources of pollution. Consequently, the White Paper concludes that changes 
in product and production technologies which alter consumption and production 
structures will also be necessary if industry is to contribute to sustainable development 
(ibid: 102). To pursue necessary changes in industrial consumption and production, the 
government proposed seven policy measures: (1) Development of environmental technologies, 
(2) Application of environmental taxes, (3) Financial support to stimulate corporate environmental 
improvements, (4) Regulatory measures in accordance with the Pollution Control Act, (5) Industrial 
recycling and reuse, (6) A national system for hazardous waste treatment and (7) Eco-labelling and 
product declarations.  
Eight years later, in White Paper 58 of 1996-97, the government proposed a revised 
“Politics for a Sustainable Development”. Surprisingly, however, sustainable development 
was not referred to as an industrial policy concern. Rather the major industrial policy 
concerns were formulated in the following manner: 
“The industry is requested to assure that the material resource use, energy use and environmental 
impacts throughout the life cycle (from production, via distribution and use, to waste disposal) are 
significantly reduced…. Norwegian industry is requested to take a lead in further development of... 
Further industry is requested to use modes of transport that generate low environmental and resource 
loads during the transport of goods to and from the industry” [author’s emphasis]. (White Paper 58 
(1996-97): 103) 
As illustrated by this text, Norwegian environmental politics took a new direction that 
may be described as “ecological modernisation” (Reitan 2001). This can be illustrated in 
three ways:  
Firstly, Norwegian environmental politics took a new direction in terms of policy 
principles. While previous policies focused on specific environmental problems and on 
conservation or protection of specific natural resources, the new focus was more systemic 
with respect to ecosystems and broader solutions. In White Paper 58, two important 
principles were introduced as premises for Norwegian environmental policy making: the 
idea of nature’s carrying capacity and the precautionary principle. The idea of nature’s 
carrying capacity -- of thresholds or critical levels in relation to ecosystems – is directly 
related to sustainability. Given the complex and interrelated nature of ecosystems, the 
precautionary principle is introduced to address situations of scientific uncertainty in the 
policy-making process. The precautionary principle implies that, faced with a risk of 
serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of scientific certainty neither justifies 
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environmental destruction nor allows postponement of policies to protect nature (Lafferty 
and Langhelle 1999).   
Secondly, with White Paper 58 the traditional focus on nature conservation through 
administrative/judicial instruments was firmly expanded and new policy instruments were 
introduced, in particular economic instruments. Cost efficiency became a guiding principle 
in environmental politics. The attempt to introduce a green tax system is a key example of 
Norwegian experiments with economic instruments in environmental policy (Ruud 2002).  
Thirdly, White Paper 58 signalled a shift to a sector-encompassing approach. 
Sustainable development issues were to be integrated in all aspects of societal planning 
and sectoral policy (Langhelle 2001; Hovden and Torjussen 2002). The principle of 
sectoral responsibility in combination with the sector-encompassing approach is still 
prevalent in Norwegian environmental policy, and has led to the development of the 
rather unique National Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS) (which will be 
elaborated upon in chapter 3 of this report).  
3.2 The Environmental Profile of the State Budget 
The “Environmental Profile of the State Budget” was the prime instrument 
contributing to horizontal environmental policy integration (HEPI) in the aftermath of 
White Paper 46 (1988-89), and as of 2004, is still standard procedure. However, it was not 
until 1997 that it was formalized as part of the Ministry of Environment’s Parliamentary 
Bill 1 (the annual budget bill). The intention of the Environmental Profile was twofold. 
First, it was intended to give an overview of funds connected to the environmental 
domains within ministries. Second, ministries were to use the Environmental Profile to 
present the main environmental challenges, targets and initiatives planned for 
implementation each new fiscal year and, if possible, to describe the effects of budget 
allocations the previous two years (Hovden and Torjussen 2002).  
The Environmental Profile has developed and improved over time. Yet, an evaluative 
report from the Office of the General Auditor11 published in 1999 concluded that it 
suffered from a number of weaknesses. Most importantly the criteria for classifying the 
budgetary funds were unclear, leading to different classifications by different ministries. 
The report also revealed that the MoE’s role as coordinator of the reporting had been 
vague (Riksrevisjonen 1999; Hovden and Torjussen 2002). This led to amusing results, 
especially in the early days when in one instance the Ministry of Defense argued that 
virtually all their spending was environmentally related, since most of their activities could 
be related to preventing nuclear warfare (Nøttestad 1999, cited in Hovden and Torjussen 
2002).  
Note that the Environmental Profile of the State Budget was established well ahead of 
the publication of White Paper 58 (1996-97), in which the National Environmental 
Monitoring System (NEMS) was introduced. 
                                              
11 The Office of the General Auditor in Norway (Riksrevisjonen) is the controlling agency of the 
Norwegian Parliament, the Storting. More information at: 
http://www.riksrevisjonen.no/Default.asp?Application=Riksrevisjonen_Engelsk (accessed March 
10th 2004). 
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3.3 National Environmental Monitoring System - NEMS 
The National Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS) is aimed at providing the 
government with information and updates on the state of the environment to enable an 
optimal environmental public policy. To our knowledge, NEMS is a promising effort 
trying to develop a monitoring framework for managing not only sectoral efforts, but also 
the overall Norwegian national environmental effort. Consequently, NEMS can be 
perceived as an ambitious initiative to strengthen both vertical and horizontal 
environmental policy integration in Norway.  
b)
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by the ministries
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Figure 2: The main elements of the National Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS)  
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, NEMS is based on four interrelated elements:  
a) The bi-annual reports from the Ministry of the Environment: “The Government’s 
Environmental Policy and the State of the Environment”;  
b) The Sectoral Environmental Action Plans (SEAP) of the ministries;  
c) Sectoral environmental reporting and the “Result Documentation System” (RDS); 
d) Cross Sectoral cost-benefit analysis 
 
As indicated, the intention of NEMS is to provide continuous reporting and updates on 
the outcomes and impacts of public environmental policy. It can be presented as a four-
stage “circular” effort:  
First, the most important element of current Norwegian environmental politics in 
general – and NEMS in particular – is MoE’s bi-annual White Paper on “The 
Government’s Environmental Policy and the State of the Environment” (referred here to 
as the ‘State of the Environment’). The bi-annual White Paper (a in Figure 2) is a 
thorough publication the aim of which is to be a steering document for national public 
environmental policy. It also presents environmental data and results in general as well as 
proposed follow-ups on the public policy priorities.   
Second, Sectoral Environmental Action Plans (b in Figure 2) have been formulated and 
published by all ministries. The plans describe the environmental challenges and 
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instruments available to meet the challenges within the various sectoral domains and are 
to be updated every four years.  
Third, documentation of results is needed (c in Figure 2). The Result Documentation 
System (RDS) is a continuous monitoring and reporting system included in NEMS to 
provide input to the bi-annual State of the Environment reports and also to enable 
monitoring of the state of the environment. The RDS will be based on statistics and 
historical data from Statistics Norway, the Norwegian environmental authorities and 
sectoral reporting by the ministries. 
Fourth, based on the results from the RDS and sectoral reporting, cross-sectoral cost-
benefit analysis (d in Figure 2) is to provide a background for the adjustment of targets or 
the use of policy instruments. Cross-sectoral analysis is expected to be presented in the 
State of the Environment report. 
 
The MoE’s bi-annual White Paper, the Sectoral Environmental Action Plans, the 
Result Documentation System and the cross-sectoral analysis are intended to constitute 
an integrated system of policy instruments, measures, and monitoring and control systems 
that will make it possible to manage environmental policy effectively. But, as shown 
below, the system is not yet fully functioning; so the potential for strengthened coherence 
horizontally and vertically has not yet been realized. According to the Norwegian 
Pollution Control Authority (SFT), NEMS is recognized worldwide as a quite innovative 
public environmental management and monitoring system12. 
 
The eight policy priority areas of NEMS13 
Before describing the three main elements of NEMS, let us briefly present the eight 
priority areas constituting the 
organizing thematic baseline in 
three of the four elements in 
NEMS: the bi-annual White 
Paper, the environmental actions 
plans and the Result 
Documentation System (RDS). 
The eight priority areas are used 
as benchmarks throughout the 
documents included in NEMS, 
thus enabling easy access for the 
public and policy-makers to 
comparable data, as well as to 
changes in environmental policy efforts. The eight priority areas (Text Box 1) are clearly 
made to fit Norwegian circumstances. Some areas might seem more important (climate 
change) than others and the scope of each priority area varies. Outdoor recreation, for 
example, would in many countries probably be handled by either the ministry of sports or 
health. That it is given its own priority area in Norway is due to the popularity in Norway 
of trekking and skiing in the vast forests and mountainous areas. At the same time the 
                                              
12 Stated by Olle Morten Grini, scientific advisor on environmental data at SFT, during a ProSus 
seminar November 6th 2003. Grini is project coordinator of the RDS. 
13 A first draft of this section was written by Maria Gjølberg, ProSus 
Text box 1: The eight policy priority areas of NEMS. 
Introduced in White Paper 58 (1996-97) 
1. Conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity 
2. Outdoor recreation 
3. The cultural heritage 
4. Eutrophication and oil pollution 
5. Hazardous substances 
6. Waste and recycling 
7. Climate change, air pollution and noise 
8. International cooperation and environmental 
protection in the polar areas 
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priority area is a supplement to bio-diversity and more traditional nature conservation 
policies. Clearly a wide variety of combinations is possible, and to discuss the basis for the 
definition of each priority area and the related environmental targets14 is beyond the scope 
of this report. We can, however provide a very brief overview of the eight policy priority 
areas:  
 
(1) Human activities are influencing and threatening biological diversity in many ways, 
and calculations show alarmingly high losses of both species and habitats (SSB 2003). 
Such losses may be the direct result of development or over-exploitation; or they may be 
caused indirectly when human activities cause pollution resulting in climate change that 
worsens conditions for animals and plants. One important way of responding to these 
challenges is to protect areas. By the end of 2001 approximately 8 per cent of Norway’s 
land was protected (SSB 2003). 
(2) Everyone should have the opportunity to take part in outdoor recreation as a 
healthy and environmentally sound leisure activity. Outdoor recreation can be sought in 
the inlands, valleys, mountains and coastal areas. However, there is great pressure from 
entrepreneurs and some politicians to develop these areas, which could result in 
restrictions on public access for recreation. 
(3) Norway’s cultural heritage is a basic source of knowledge about people’s lives and 
activities throughout history and must be preserved. It can improve the understanding of 
the links between history and the present, with different cultures and the natural 
environment. Cultural monuments, sites and landscapes are, however, damaged by 
changes in land use. 
(4) Eutrophication is caused by excessive discharges of nutrients into water, resulting in 
a deterioration of water quality. The nutrients most responsible are phosphorus and 
nitrogen, and the main sources are industry, agriculture, fish farming and households. 
Both marine areas and fresh water bodies are affected. Discharges of oil and chemicals 
from shipping, petroleum activities and onshore activities can damage organisms and 
ecosystems in the open sea, on the sea floor, in the littoral zone and on land. Pollution of 
coastal areas also reduces their value as recreation areas.     
(5) The use of hazardous chemicals and emissions of these substances are responsible 
for one of the most serious environmental threats. A number of chemicals break down 
very slowly in the environment and therefore accumulate in food chains. They are a 
serious threat to biological diversity, food supplies, our health and the health of future 
generations. The most harmful chemicals, including persistent organic pollutants (POPs) 
such as PCBs and dioxins, can cause damage even at very low concentrations. 
(6) Waste causes environmental problems because waste treatment releases pollutants. 
Waste dumped in land fills generates emissions of methane – a greenhouse gas. Landfills 
may also contain POPs and heavy metals that may pollute air and water. Waste 
incineration eliminates methane emissions but generates other air pollution. Hazardous 
waste is also generated by waste incineration.  However, new technology has made it 
                                              
14 Each policy priority area has a set of strategic objectives, operational national targets and related 
key indicators. These are available in English at http://www.environment.no/ (accessed May 19 
2004) or in the English summary of the second State of the Environment report (White Paper 24 
(2000-2001)), available at http://odin.dep.no/md/engelsk/publ/stmeld/022001-040011/dok-
bn.html  (accessed May 19, 2004). 
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possible to reduce hazardous emissions. Waste contains both energy and materials that 
can be recovered, and the recovered materials can be used to replace primary materials.  
(7) Concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are rising as a result of 
human activity. The most important reason for this is emissions of CO2 from combustion 
of fossil fuels. As concentrations rise, the atmosphere retains more of the thermal 
radiation from the earth, which will cause the global mean temperature to increase – 
leading to climate change. Emission of gases containing chlorine and bromine such as 
CFCs and HCFCs and halons deplete the atmospheric ozone layer which protects the 
earth against harmful UV radiation from the sun. Excessive UV radiation may damage 
people, plants and animals and particularly polar marine ecosystems.   
Acid rain caused by emissions of sulphur and nitrogen compounds into the air is still 
one of the most serious environmental problems in Norway. Emissions from other 
European countries account for 90 per cent of acid rain deposition in Norway (SSB 
2003). Local air pollution may cause serious health problems in urban areas. In the largest 
cities, a high proportion of the population is exposed to concentrations of pollutants that 
increase the risk of premature death and cause health problems such as respiratory 
infections and lung diseases. 
Noise is an environmental problem affecting a large number of people in Norway (SSB 
2003). According to Statistics Norway, 5 per cent of Norwegians have sleep problems due 
to noise. The ‘noise annoyance index’ developed by Statistics Norway indicates that as 
much as 73 per cent of noise annoyances is caused by road traffic. Industry accounts for 
14 per cent and railways for 4 per cent. 
(8) International cooperation on environmental challenges must be strengthened in 
order to gain more control over international and cross-border environmental problems. 
Such cooperation would also help to mitigate foreign sources causing environmental 
damage in Norway. The polar areas are coming under growing pressure from human 
activities such as tourism, mining and pollution. For example, concentrations of 
environmentally hazardous PCBs in polar bears in Svalbard (Spitsbergen) have been 
found to be up to six times higher than concentrations of PCBs in polar bears in Canada. 
Norway controls areas in both the Arctic and the Antarctic. In recent years, Norwegian 
authorities have given higher priority to management of the natural environment in 
Norway’s arctic territories.  
3.3.1 The series of bi-annual White Papers on the State of the Environment 
The series of bi-annual15 White Papers on “The Government’s Environmental policy 
and the State of the Environment” (referred to as a in figure 1) is the main publication 
and in many ways the cornerstone of NEMS. The series contains systematic reports on 
trends in the eight environmental priority areas referred to above and it presents the main 
elements in Norway’s environmental policy. The ambitions are substantial. As stated in 
White Paper 8 (1999-2000: 9): “Just as the State Budget describes the framework for the 
Government’s economic policy and economic trends, this White Paper is intended to 
describe the Government’s ecological policy and environmental trends. The White Paper 
                                              
15 The original intention was to publish annual reports, but the Parliament asked the Ministry of the 
Environment to prepare only bi-annual reports.  
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will therefore be submitted at the same time as the State Budget is presented [authors’ 
translation]”. 
Three bi-annual White Papers – “State of the Environment” – have so far been 
published. A fairly strict framework to systematize the reports has been established. The 
reports begin with a short introduction describing the environmental policy and its main 
principles, and then present the government’s main priority areas and specific cross-
sectoral efforts. The main body of the report, however, describes the environmental 
policies and the state of the environment pertaining to the eight priority areas referred to 
above. Each priority area is structured in the same way: it contains a presentation of the 
goals and targets of the specific area, the state of the environment, goals achieved, and the 
policy instruments and initiatives in use. The goals are divided into two levels: strategic 
objectives and operational national targets. 
The strategic objectives are the government’s superior goals for each of the eight policy 
priority areas. The strategic objectives express a political ambition on reaching or 
maintaining an environmental quality within a reasonable time frame. There is usually 
only one strategic objective for each priority area. An example is the strategic objective for 
depletion of the ozon layer: “All production and use of ozone-depleting substances is to 
be eliminated” (White Paper 8 (1999-2000)). The strategic objectives are then concretized 
as operational national targets expressing results that will be achieved within a shorter 
time frame. The targets are intended to reflect the main environmental problems and 
challenges within each result area and should, as long as there is sound scientific basis for 
it, be verifiable and related to specified time limits for fulfilling the targets set. Let us again 
illustrate with an example from the depletion of the ozon layer: “1) The consumption of 
halons, all types of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), tetrachloromethane, methyl chloroform 
and hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs) shall be eliminated. 2) Consumption of methyl 
bromide shall be stabilized in 1995 and phased out by 2005. 3) Consumption of 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) shall be stabilized in 1995 and phased out by 2015” 
(ibid). The operational targets are further the basis for sectoral working targets enabling 
the formulation of sectoral Environmental Action Plans from each Ministry. 
3.3.2 Sectoral Environmental Action Plans (SEAP) 
The sectoral Environmental Action Plans (b in Figure 1) are an important part of the 
government’s environmental politics to ensure coherence and to promote environmental 
policy integration. Each ministry is responsible for presenting a sectoral plan that covers 
the administrative domain of the ministry and sectoral areas of responsibility. Plans must 
present the environmental impact of the sector, the driving forces behind the impact, the 
sectoral environmental goals, and instruments and efforts to be used to deal with the 
identified challenges. The design and reasoning of the Pressure-State-Response (PSR) is 
very much influenced by the Drivers Pressures, State, Impact, and Response – DPSIR 
framework – developed by the European Environment Agency (EEA). 16   
Multiple sectors often contribute to the same environmental problems. Thus the idea 
behind the Sectoral Environmental Action Plan is to illuminate the sectoral 
                                              
16 The PSR model was developed by the OECD and is a simplified version of the DPSIR model 
proposed by the European Environment Agency (EEA). For further details see: 
http://glossary.eea.eu.int/EEAGlossary/D/DPSIR  
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responsibilities related to the eight priority areas and how each sector will contribute to 
solve environmental challenges. Further, as stated in White Paper 58 of 1996-97, the 
action plans may show how each ministry can contribute to fulfilling the government’s 
overall environmental policy towards sustainable development. It is decided by the 
Norwegian Parliament – in accordance with White Paper 8 of 1998-99 – that the sectoral 
action plans must be updated every four years. Each ministry has, however, only 
published one SEAP. Statskonsult17 (2003) has evaluated the plans, and a decision on 
how to proceed with the SEAPs is pending in the MoE. 
In general the Environmental Action Plans are divided into three sections: An 
introductory section presents a summary of the ministry’s main environmental challenges, 
responsibilities and responses, and an overview of the government’s environmental policy. 
The second section is a status report presenting the environmental issues especially 
relevant for the particular ministry/sector. The third section contains a presentation of the 
eight policy priority areas. In this section, strategic objectives and operational national 
targets are referred to and the ministries are asked to specify the particular sectoral 
challenges and responses in each priority area. The Environmental Action Plans published 
by all Ministries must follow the framework and references included in MoE’s bi-annual 
White Paper 'State of the environment'.  
3.3.3  Reporting and documentation of environmental results 
NEMS is dependent on a well-functioning system for reporting and documenting 
results of environmental policy implementation in each sector. White Paper 58 (1996-
97:15) states that:  
The Government will further develop a national result monitoring system [RDS] for implemented 
environmental measures, environmental impacts, and the state of the environment. This will provide the 
necessary basis for being able to control development in a sustainable direction, for instance by making 
it possible to see the aggregate environmental impact of the activity within various sectors in an overall 
context. (author’s translation) 
This was further specified in White Paper 8 of 1998-99, the first ‘State of the 
Environment Report’, and the State Pollution Control Board (SFT) was asked by the MoE 
to develop a system with key indicators. This system became the Result and 
Documentation System (RDS). However, for NEMS to function efficiently, the various 
sectors and particular ministries must submit actual results of the implementation of 
sectoral Environmental Action Plans in accordance with the eight policy priority areas 
(see Text Box 1 above). This remains a challenge. 
3.3.3.1 The Result and Documentation System (RDS) 
The goal of the RDS (c in Figure 1) is to assemble environmental data which can be 
measured, calculated and registered in order to follow up the government’s environmental 
policy. The RDS is a web-based documentation system developed and administered by the 
Norwegian Pollution Control Authorities (SFT)18, and is primarily based on statistics and 
                                              
17 Statskonsult is a state-owned limited company that deals with public management development. 
For more information visit: www.statskonsult.no (Accessed Sept 15, 2004) 
18 http://www.sft.no/english/ (Accessed Sept 8, 2004) 
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information from SFT, the Statistics Norway (SSB)19 and other environmental public 
policy agencies in Norway20. Most data is updated annually, but some of it will be updated 
continuously. Reports will be delivered to the MoE annually. It is, however, possible for 
the environmental agencies and the MoE to assemble a wide variety of data for specific 
purposes whenever needed.  
As of April 200421 SFT was developing a prototype including data from the main 
environmental public policy agencies. Based on a Pressure-State-Response-model,22 the 
RDS will consist of descriptions of:  
− the state of the environment relative to given environmental goals and key figures;  
− the government’s use of policy instruments to meet environmental goals  
− response of the environment and change of conduct in the sectors as a response to 
the use of  policy instruments  
 
According to the plan and design, the RDS will contribute to strengthening 
environmental public policy making by the government and in the sectors. Consequently, 
a well-functioning RDS may facilitate both VEPI and HEPI as data assembled in RDS will 
provide new possibilities for documentation and evaluation of environmental policy. Data 
from the RDS will be provided to the bi-annual State of the Environment report, the 
environmental and sectoral authorities and to the web site www.environment.no (a 
simplified and popularized version of the RDS). The web site is an information source on 
the state of the environment and the government’s environmental policy – systematized 
around the eight priority areas of NEMS. 
3.3.3.2 Sectoral Reporting – still a missing link 
A crucial element of NEMS is sectoral reporting (c in Figure 1 above) of results from 
the ministries’ implementation of their sectoral action plans. Sectoral reporting, a 
responsibility of individual ministries, was supposed to be done annually, not only to 
facilitate internal follow up of the ministries’ policy implementation, but also to enable the 
functioning of the RDS in accordance with established routines, formats and standards. 
However, as of September 2004 no ministry had yet initiated this task. A clarification from 
the MoE on the RDS, and on the NEMS in particular, will be needed to fulfill the 
objectives stated in Whitepaper 58 (1996-97) and specified in the first State of the 
Environment Report. But this clarification is still pending in the MoE. The fourth State of 
the Environment Report to be published in 2005 might give the governments position on 
how to proceed on sectoral reporting. 
3.3.4 Cross sectoral analysis 
Partly based on the information from RDS, cross sectoral analyses are expected to give 
important feedback to NEMS. Such analyses are intended to form the basis for cross-
sectoral applications of policy instruments. ProSus is, however, only aware of one cross 
                                              
19 http://www.ssb.no/english/ (Accessed Sept 8, 2004) 
20 For the full list of contributors to the RDS please consult: 
http://www.environment.no/templates/TopPage.aspx?id=3142#B . (Accessed Sept 10, 2003) 
21 The project started in 1998 after the proposal in White Paper 58 (1996-97). 
22 For further details see footnote 16. 
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sectoral analysis completed so far. The Norwegian Pollution Control Authority completed 
in 2000 a cross sectoral cost analysis of Norwegian measures to abate climate change. The 
2000 analysis was revised in 2002. Norwegian policy is currently based on the calculation 
that the cost of fulfilling Norway’s Kyoto obligations is NOK350 per tonne CO2 
equivalents. With a quota price lower than NOK350, it would be more cost effective to 
make use of the Kyoto mechanisms. The extent to which this will be cost effective will 
depend on the international quota price. For example, at a quota price of NOK150, 
Norway can fulfil 60 per cent of its Kyoto obligation cost effectively through national 
action. 
3.4 The current status of public environmental governance in Norway 
A full assessment of NEMS has not been conducted, primarily because parts of the 
system – particularly the sectoral reporting by each ministry – have not yet been 
implemented. The Sectoral Environmental Action Plans, however, have been evaluated by 
Statskonsult.23 Statskonsult states that all ministries have issued a first generation 
Environmental Action Plan,24 and a summary of each plan has been presented in the State 
of the Environment reports. Nevertheless, Statskonsult (2003) concludes as follows: 
• The Sectoral Environmental Action Plans vary significantly in scope and content. 
• The plans are not very concrete or demanding 
• The plans have only to a limited degree functioned as steering documents in the ministries 
• The composition of the plans has varied regarding the degree of political involvement and 
priority in each ministry 
• Work based on the plans has to date had little effect on the environment  
Twelve of the fifteen action plans are written in accordance with the NEMS structure 
and with explicit reference to the eight priority areas. However, only two ministries have 
developed sector-specific objectives in accordance with the eight priority areas. And only 
in one case did a ministry actually present a total overview of policy instruments related to 
the priority areas. Most interesting is Statskonsult’s conclusion that none of the ministries 
explicitly present inter-ministerial collaborative environmental initiatives. The evaluation 
confirms that several of the sectoral ministries do collaborate with the Ministry of 
Environment. However, no collaboration with other ministries on environmentally related 
challenges is documented. Finally, in none of the sectoral Environmental Action Plans are 
cost estimates specified for particular environmental initiatives or projects. 
Apparently there are a lot of challenges to be resolved with respect to the sectoral 
Environmental Action Plans and with respect to NEMS in general. According to 
representatives from MoE, however, one additional effort is referred to as a valid 
indication of proper environmental governance: Environmental Assessments. 
 
 
                                              
23 Statskonult (The Directorate for Communication and Public Management): 
http://www.statskonsult.no/info/english.htm (Accessed Sept. 18, 2003) 
24 The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs have together submitted a plan,The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not made their plan public, but a copy can be obtained by contacting 
the Ministry. 
 34 
Environmental Assessments 
Agenda 21, particularly chapter 8, recommends the use of two types of environmental 
assessment in national policy: Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) concerns the 
environmental impact of specific projects while Strategic Environmental Assessment 
(SEA) concerns environmental consequences of policies, plans and programme initiatives. 
EIA and SEA could easily have been incorporated in NEMS, but they were not. However, 
EIA was at least incorporated in the Planning and Building Act in 1990 and regulations 
regarding EIA were strengthened in 1996 as a result of an EU directive on EIA (Hovden 
and Torjussen 2002). 
Despite the fact that an expansion of traditional EIA principles to policy related issues 
may be somewhat problematic, Norway has also taken steps towards implementing SEA. 
SEA is perceived worldwide as an important tool for achieving sustainable development 
(Husby 1997). However, SEA requires that significant effects of all proposals submitted to 
the cabinet and the parliament must be assessed by the ministry responsible for the 
proposal and the MoE must be consulted in the process (Husby 1997:17-19). In 2000 the 
Administrative Order of 1994 was replaced by a new order, but significant room was left 
for interpretation regarding which policies and projects should be subject to assessment 
(Torjussen 2002). 
3.5 Summary of the Norwegian environmental policy trajectory 
The environmental policy trajectory presented above has provided a brief 
understanding of changes in Norwegian environmental policy governance. The principle 
of sector responsibility was institutionalized in 1997 as part of NEMS. This is a unique 
and innovative policy effort to enable policy coordination and integration across different 
sectoral interests and responsibilities. The NEMS cannot however be characterized as 
fully operational. Three bi-annual State of the Environment reports have been produced 
and presented to the Parliament, all ministries have published their Environmental Action 
Plans (SEAP), and the Pollution Control Board has developed a prototype for a Result 
and Documentation System. Nevertheless, sectoral reporting on the status of efforts 
implemented in accordance with the eight policy priority areas has not been completed. 
Further, the first generation SEAPs – supposed to be updated every four years – were as of 
September 2004 not commenced. The SEAPs have been evaluated by Statskonsult, but 
while MoE is considering how to proceed, few actions have been taken. There are also 
challenges related to the cross sectoral analysis. To our knowledge only one such analysis 
has been completed (on climate change), perhaps because the task is more complicated 
than expected. 
Besides the challenges associated with policy efforts promoting a NEMS, there are 
other policy challenges. Concerning the proposed benchmarks on HEPI and VEPI, it is 
questionable whether current public procedures of environmental assessment are strategic 
in nature. We question whether SEAs include explicit alternatives to proposed projects or 
policies. Rather, the assessments seem to be limited to a technical screening of already 
chosen alternatives. If this is the case concerning environmental politics alone, SEAs 
relevance for Norwegian sustainable development policy may be questioned. Does the 
National Action Plan for Sustainable Development – NA21 – makes a difference? 
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4 THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT – NA2125 
As part of the State Budget for 2004 (White Paper 1 (2003-2004) chapter 6), the 
government proposed a national Action Plan for sustainable development – NA21. The 
Ministry of Finance is given the responsibility for NA21. NA21 is following up on the Rio 
Summit on Sustainable Development in 1992, the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable 
Development in 2002, the Nordic Strategy for Sustainable Development from 2001 and 
other international obligations. Agenda 21 from the Rio Summit encourages all nations to 
develop strategies and action plans for sustainable development (UN 1993: Ch 8.7).  The 
Norwegian Government states that work on NA21 draws from the experience of other 
countries where such plans have already been produced (White Paper 1 2003-2004: Ch 
6.1). Further it states that it:  
…is important that the initiatives on Sustainable Development are closely connected to the main 
political and economical documents… and;  
…to avoid that the work on Sustainable Development and environmental policies leads their own lives 
side by side these [budget etc] political processes. (Author’s translation) 
As part of mapping the environmental policy trajectory of Norway, we want to 
determine if statement is valid. One would expect NA21 to draw on and be in 
accordance with NEMS. So, to what extent are the efforts formulated in NA21 
connected to ongoing political processes of public environmental governance? 
4.1 The content of NA21 
NA21 briefly discusses the concept “sustainable development”, draws up the lines from 
the Brundtland Commission via the Rio and Johannesburg summits and recalls important 
documents such as the Rio Declaration, the Climate Convention, the Convention on Bio-
diversity, the UN Millennium Development Goals26 and the Plan of Implementation from 
Johannesburg. NA21 recalls that the discussion on sustainable development is based on 
the three pillars of economic, social and environmental issues.  
NA21 emphasizes the need to keep the carrying capacity of the earth in mind, and the 
need for de-coupling economic growth from environmental protection. Global trends and 
challenges are presented for a variety of issues such as global trade barriers and reindeer 
farming in Norway. The action plan also presents several principles that are intended to 
influence political actions. Explicit references are made to the precautionary principle and 
“polluter pays” principles and to eco-system thinking and the carrying capacity of Earth.  
Inspired by ongoing work in OECD, EU and the Nordic Council of Ministers, 
indicators are proposed in selected issue areas (developmental aid; GHG emissions and 
trans-boundary pollutants; biological diversity and sustainable economic development). It 
                                              
25 As of April 2004, an English version of the complete action plan is available on the following url: 
http://odin.dep.no/archive/finvedlegg/01/39/nat_a060.pdf 
26 For further information please consult http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (accessed Nov 12, 
2003) 
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is emphasized, however, that these are preliminary and that an indicator committee or 
expert group should be established during the fall of 2003. An annual indicator report is 
proposed, and it will be a central part of a proposed information strategy for NA21 (White 
Paper 1 2003-2004: Ch 6.6.5). The five-member-strong expert committee was appointed 
by the Ministry of Finance in December 2004 with the mandate of proposing indicators to 
strengthen sustainable development. This work is scheduled to be finished when a White 
Paper is published (scheduled for the end of 2004). 
4.1.1 The national policy for sustainable development 
Section 6.5 of the action plan deals more explicitly with the policy for sustainable 
development. The Government has chosen to focus on seven main policy areas. Actions 
within each area are being 
proposed. Examples of initiatives in 
each main policy area, with 
emphasis on environmental policy 
priorities, are presented below.  
Area 1, International 
cooperation for sustainable 
development and reduction of 
poverty, is mainly concerned with 
issues related to poverty reduction 
and developmental aid. But it is 
also concerned with international and regional cooperation on environmental and 
sustainable development issues. The government assures that it will promote and 
strengthen environmental aspects in international trade regulations, and promote equality 
between the WTO free trade agreements and multilateral environmental agreements. The 
government has tasked the Minister of Environment, Børge Brende, who will serve as 
chairman of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) during 2003 and 2004, 
with promoting the environmental pillar of sustainable development.  
The government’s main goal concerning climate under Area 2, Climate, Ozone and 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, is to take national and international 
responsibility for working on global climate issues. Concerning ozone, the government’s 
main goal is to stop all emissions of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) in Norway. The 
government guarantees that it will meet its obligations under the Montreal Protocol27 and 
EU regulations of 200228, and to continuing its work to assure that the phasing out of 
ODS does not result in increased use of potent GHGs like hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). 
Later in section three of this report we will discuss the case of Shecco Technology. It is an 
example of Norwegian efforts to promote environmentally sound innovation reducing use 
of HFCs. 
                                              
27 “The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer”, agreed on September 16, 
1987 at the Headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal. Available 
at: http://www.unep.org/ozone/montreal.shtml (Accessed Nov 14th 2003). 
28 Regulation (EC) No 2037/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 2000. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_244/l_24420000929en00010024.pdf (Accessed Nov 14th 2003). 
Text box 2: Main policy areas presented in NA21 
1. International cooperation for sustainable 
development and reduction of poverty 
2. Climate, Ozone and Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution 
3. Biological Diversity and Cultural Heritage 
4. Natural resources 
5. Health and Hazardous Chemicals 
6. Sustainable Economic Development 
7. Sami (Nordic indigenous people) perspectives on 
environmental and resource allocation
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Biological Diversity and Cultural Heritage are heavily emphasized. The government 
aims to eliminate the loss of biological diversity in Norway by 2010. An extensive White 
Paper entitled “Biological Diversity – Sector Responsibility and Coordination” (White 
Paper 42 2000-2001) has been published, and biological diversity and forest protection 
have been high on the political agenda. Area 4, Natural Resources, is central in the 
Norwegian context, due to the natural resources and especially the large petroleum 
reserves on the Norwegian continental shelf. The government’s main goal in policy Area 5 
of NA21 is to assure that emissions and the use of hazardous chemicals do not lead to 
damage to either human health or nature’s reproductive capacity.  
Area 6, sustainable economic development, is concerned with issues such as social 
welfare initiatives, education and R&D. Interestingly however, in a MONIT context, are 
the proposals on research for sustainable development through the Research Council of 
Norway and the reference to the Government Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation 
Policy29 (HIP), which was presented a few weeks after NA21. The government claims that 
HIP is consistent with NA21 and that innovations’ significance for the environment, 
health and development is one of many causes for developing a more a coherent 
innovation policy. We will return to this in Part 2. Next we will focus on environmental 
policy and whether NA21 contributes to strengthening the management of Norwegian 
environmental policy. 
4.2 Does NA21 contribute to a strengthened management of 
Norwegian environmental policy 
The proposed policy for sustainable development touches upon many challenges, but 
does it promote coherence in Norwegian environmental policy? From a MONIT 
perspective, the following passage on page 22 in NA21 is of interest: “the work on 
sustainable development requires that economic, social and environmental considerations 
related to each other. This requires an integration of decision-making at several political 
levels”. The government emphasizes that NA21 will be followed-up in various ministry 
White Papers. For the environmental aspect of sustainable development we assume that 
this at least is related to the bi-annual State of the Environment reports. However, only 
indicators on climate change/transboundary air pollution and biological diversity are 
included in NA21. Therefore, what is the relationship of NA21 to NEMS?  
It is interesting to note that the seven main policy areas in NA21 do not fully 
correspond to the eight environmental priority areas in the NEMS documents. One 
reason for this is that sustainable development encompasses not only environmental 
issues but also social and economic issues. However, it is interesting to note that there are 
no references to the relationship between the benchmarks included in NA21 (Box 2) and 
benchmarks in NEMS (Box 1) which were presented in the previous chapter. 
Apparently, there are difficulties in coordinating efforts by the MoE under NEMS, with 
efforts by the Ministry of Finance under NA21. Throughout the 1990s Norwegian 
authorities established a number of inter-ministerial committees and groups to address 
sustainable development issues. Some of these groups have been ad hoc, reporting on 
                                              
29 In Norwegian termed ”Fra idè til verdi. Regjeringens plan for en helhetlig innovasjonspolitikk” 
(HIP) (MoTI 2003) 
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single issues such as environmental taxes, climate policy, environmental instruments, 
biodiversity and sustainable consumption (Hovden and Torjussen 2002). An official 
Norwegian Report (NOU 4 1995) from 1995 showed that the inter-ministerial committees 
and groups had been successful in reducing conflicts and laying a foundation for inter-
ministerial cooperation. However, Hovden and Torjussen (2002:25) point out that 
cooperation depends in part on the ministries’ willingness to prioritize environmental 
interests over sectoral interests, and that this is due to the fact that the Ministry of 
Environment does not exercise ultimate power on environmental issues and is therefore 
forced to negotiate objectives and strategies with other ministries.  
The National Action Plan for Sustainable Development proposes that the Ad Hoc 
Inter-ministerial Steering Committee, consisting of deputy ministers, be converted into a 
permanent committee. This would be a welcome development, but it remains to be seen 
how (if formed) a permanent committee would affect institutionalized practices 
concerning governing of NEMS. 
In accordance with the proposals made in White Paper 58 (1996-97) and specified in the 
first ‘State of the Environment’ report in 1999-2000, a list of major environmental 
challenges was formulated in accordance with the eight environmental priority areas. The 
evaluation conducted by Statskonsult (2003) confirms that all ministries have formulated 
a sectoral Environmental Action Plan. However, regarding consistent and regular 
implementation of both EIA and SEA, the picture is less promising. This is confirmed 
regarding timetables and quantitative indicator-based targets stipulated in the sectoral 
Environmental Action Plans. The question is: Does this also influence coherence with 
public innovation policies? This has relevance for the integration of environmental 
concerns into innovation policy – the subject of the next chapter.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 2 
 
 
Coherence of environmental and innovation policies 
in Norway – a presentation of current efforts 
promoted by the Ministry of the Environment and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 
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5 THE DEGREE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
INTEGRATION IN PROMOTING GREEN 
INNOVATIONS 
The environmental policy system has been presented with reference to the National 
Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS). This has been complemented with a 
presentation of the National Action Plan for Sustainable Development (NA21). We have 
documented that efforts promoted by each ministry are in accordance with the principles 
of sectoral responsibility. However, the national environmental governance that could be 
strengthened by NEMS still has significant potential for improvement.  
In NA21 references are made to the government’s plan for a comprehensive 
innovation policy (HIP). The government claims that HIP will be consistent with NA21. 
Further, it is stated in NA21 that innovation’s significance for the environment is one 
reason for developing a more coherent innovation policy. We take this at face value and 
proceed below with a presentation of the actual coordinated efforts between 
environmental and innovation policy with reference to environmental policy integration 
and the benchmarks related to horizontal integration (HEPI) and vertical integration 
(VEPI) presented in chapter 2. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, chapter 6 on the 
horizontal dimension will elaborate further on relevant White Papers in which references 
to governance for green innovation could be found. We start by reviewing documents on 
environmental policy, then review the latest efforts on sustainable development, and 
finally review the comprehensive innovation policy plan (HIP). In particular we elaborate 
on documents referred to in the previous environmental policy section in this report, by 
analyzing the content of White Paper 48 of 1988-89, White Paper 58 of 1996-97 and the 
three bi-annual ‘State of the Environment Reports’. Do the environmental policy 
documents have references to green innovation? We will also analyze the content of 
NA21, and will conclude by discussing the status of green innovation efforts within 
Norwegian sustainable development politics.  
 
 
Figure 3: The vertical dimensions of MoE and MoTI. 
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A study of the horizontal dimension, however, would be incomplete without a detailed 
description of innovation policy efforts. Consequently, we describe the government’s plan 
for a comprehensive innovation policy (HIP). Our aim is to identify policy efforts to 
promote green innovations. Finally, we discuss to what extent a environmental and 
innovation policies are integrated horizontally to promote green innovation. 
Then in chapter 7 we will, in accordance with the project description, study the efforts 
of the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Trade and Industry to promote green 
innovation within their sectors. Explicit references are made to their Environmental 
Action Plans, the environmental profile of the State Budget and MoE’s and MoTI’s 
directorates and other subsector activities. 
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6 ENVIRONMENTAL AND INNOVATION POLICY: 
THE HORIZONTAL DIMENSION 
White Papers 46 (1988-89) and 58 (1996-97) are, along with recent bi annual “State of 
the Environment” reports, the most important and influential environmental policy 
documents. They are the cornerstones of Norwegian environmental policy. Prime 
Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland,30 former head of the World Commission for Sustainable 
Development (WCED), had significant influence in the drafting of the two White Papers. 
In general, White Paper 46 is more pro-active than White Paper 58 regarding how public 
actors should be involved in promoting trade, industry and environmental responsibility 
(Ruud 2002). In this report, however, we will study how the two White Papers can be 
related to green innovations. This chapter will focus on current innovation policy 
documents and particularly on the government’s plan for comprehensive innovation 
policy – HIP. We search environmental, sustainable development and innovation policy 
documents, for references to the actual interface of environmental and innovation policy. 
This is done to answer the following question: To what extent is it possible to document 
public policy efforts to promote green innovations? 
6.1 White Paper 46 (1988-89) “Environment and Development. 
Norway’s follow up of the World Commission’s Report”  
In the first section of the White Paper reference is made to “…a national goal for 
environmental technology…”: 
“The Government is committed to an initiative for the development of environmental technology. By 
this initiative it is possible to combine the need to solve our own environmental problems and  the 
possibilities of developing new products and markets for Norwegian business and industry.”31 (White 
Paper 46 (1988-89): Ch 5.6.1 “National Goals and Actions to solve the main challenges”)  
This message is further emphasized in the second section of the White Paper (Ch 10.4 
and 10.5), which refers to policy instruments promoting 1) changes in product 2) changes 
in processing technologies 3) end-of-pipe-oriented pollution control. The main policy 
instrument for these three strategies is the development of environmental technology. 
Research and cooperation between industry and the authorities must be improved. The 
government explicitly stated that the transition from research and development to 
diffusion and the widely adopted use of environmental technology has proved to be 
difficult and that this problem will be addressed (White Paper 46 (1988-89): Ch 10.5). 
According to the White Paper, the development of environmental technology will be 
stimulated by state development contracts. It is further emphasized that to monitor the 
                                              
30 Gro Harlem Brundtland headed three Norwegian governments: from Feb 4th 1981 – Oct 14th 
1981, from May 9th 1986 – Oct 16th 1989 and from Nov 3rd 1990 – Oct 25th 1996. 
31 Authors’ translation. Original text: “Regjeringen går inn for en større satsing på utvikling av 
miljøteknologi. Gjennom en slik satsing kan en kombinere behovene for løsninger på våre egne 
miljøproblemer med muligheten til å omsette nye produkter og vinne nye markeder for norsk 
næringsliv” 
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development of environmental technology it is necessary to coordinate instruments being 
utilized and to develop new policy instruments for that purpose. Chapter 10.5.1 
emphasizes that strengthening of policy coordination in this field will be considered to 
monitor research on environmental technology and coordinate use of existing and new 
policy instruments for industrializing and utilizing new technologies. Finally, the White 
Paper states that government procurement policies should favor environmentally sound 
products. As proposed in Whiter Paper 46 (1988-89), the government launched a national 
campaign promoting cleaner production. The development of environmental technology 
was given high priority and special programmes were supported by the Ministry of 
Environment and Ministry of Industry and Energy. At the same time two comprehensive 
R&D programmes were organized and funded by the Research Council of Norway. The 
objective of the programmes was to strengthen the competitiveness of Norwegian 
companies by increasing productivity, reducing environmental impacts, developing 
environmental technology and improving management 
The national campaign for cleaner production technologies was funded by 50 million 
NOK annually between 1991 and 1995. Demonstration projects were launched in several 
companies, with the goal of implementing cleaner production strategies at plant level.32 
The environmental improvements which resulted from these projects were disseminated 
to other companies. Finally, strengthened efforts were made to promote technical 
environmental assessments of pollution-intensive industries – with the aim of both 
documenting existing emissions, and, more importantly, pursuing cleaner production. 
Assessments of about 300 companies were conducted.33 
In 1995 a survey of 224 firms which had been offered technical environmental 
assessment schemes, was undertaken to identify the results and lessons learned from the 
cleaner production campaign (Aasen and Onsager 1995). Respondents generally said 
that34 the assessments benefited them economically through lower expenditure due to 
reduced and/or more efficient use of production input and that emissions were lowered 
because wastes were reduced. About 39 percent of the firms which had been offered 
technical environmental assessment schemes reduced their discharges of pollutants into 
water by more than 20 percent. These firms reduced both waste from production and 
hazardous waste. Ten per cent of the surveyed firms reduced waste and discharges by 
more than 50 percent. Only 9 per cent stated that the assessments had not led to 
improvement of the environment. Despite the promising results the assessment schemes 
promoting industrial environmental improvements (that also could trigger green 
innovations) were discontinued.  
The focus on environmental technology and greening of industry in White Paper 46 
(1988-89) was significant. It was therefore expected that White Paper 58 (1996-97), aimed 
at establishing a sustainable development policy in Norway, would include policy 
initiatives on green innovations.  
                                              
32 According to Uno Abrahamsen, at the State Pollution Control Board, such demonstration 
projects included recovery of sulphur at Statoil’s Slagentangen oil refinery and strengthened control 
of nitrogen emissions at Norsk Hydro’s Glomfjord fertilizer plant.  
33 ibid 
34 The response rate was remarkably high as 216 out of 224 firms returned the questionnaire. 
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6.2 White Paper 58 (1996-97): “Environmental Policy for Sustainable 
Development” 
The promised White Paper on Sustainable Development (SD) policy – announced in 
the cleaner production campaign – did not become the policy document on SD that many 
expected. It turned out to be limited to an environmental policy for SD. Once again the 
Norwegian Government postponed the commitments it had made in accordance with 
chapter 8 of Agenda 21. While the focus on environmental technologies and the 
promotion of green innovations was quite explicit in White Paper 46, these issues were 
hardly mentioned in White Paper 58. Instead, White Paper 46 focused on such policy 
instruments as fiscal measures and voluntary agreements. Industry was asked to be more 
pro-active, and encouraged to extend the life time of their products and focus on the 
products lifecycle. However, no concrete measures were proposed by the government. 
In Chapter 7.3, which deals with national climate policy, development of 
environmental technology is briefly mentioned. Special reference is made to a five-year 
research programme KLIMATEK initiated in 1997 by the Research Council of Norway. 
KLIMATEK was co-financed by the MoE, MoPE, and MoTI. Its objective was to test 
technologies which could reduce emissions of CO2 and other GHGs. Further, in White 
Paper 58, development of environmental technologies is mentioned in relation to policy 
instruments for renewable energy production (Ch 7.3.2.3). The most concrete step is a 50 
million NOK grant from the state budget of 1997 to develop bio-energy technology. Solar 
energy, heat pumps and wind energy are also briefly mentioned but not with reference to 
green innovative efforts. Emphasis was placed on facilitating use of renewable energy but 
very few concrete efforts were presented. The most concrete efforts concerned energy-
saving schemes.  
Despite promising results, in 1995 the government decided to discontinue the cleaner 
production campaign which it had launched with White Paper 46 (1988-89). White Paper 
58 (1996-97) announced the establishment of an environmental fund (“Statens 
Miljøfond”) to stimulate development of environmental technologies, but after the initial 
funding of NOK 250 million was spent, it also was discontinued. This was also the fate of 
targeted technology funds under the FUNN programme of the Research Council. 
SkatteFUNN later replaced FUNN, but SkatteFUNN is reflecting the objective of 
promoting fiscal neutrality in public policy implementation and does not have any 
targeted technology or environmental objectives.   
In contrast to White Paper 46 (1988-89) no specific green innovation efforts are called 
for in White Paper 58 (1996-97). Consequently, except for prospects for tax deductions, 
the Government assumes that green innovations and cleaner production are to be 
promoted by industries themselves. Rather than motivating industry through special policy 
schemes to promote cleaner production, vague requests are chosen as the public policy 
option. Under policies recommended in White Paper 58, the greening of industry is to a 
large extent left to market forces; the associated risks are to be borne by the firms 
themselves. 
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6.3 The bi-annual ‘State of the Environment’ reports 
Green innovations are hardly mentioned in the bi-annual White Papers on “The 
Governments Environmental Policy and the State of the Environment”. The White Paper 
on “the State of the Environment”, as mentioned above, is the main publication and in 
many ways the cornerstone of NEMS. As stated in White Paper 8 (1999-2000: 9): “Just as 
the State Budget describes the Government’s economic policy and economic trends; this 
White Paper is intended to describe the Government’s ecological policy and 
environmental trends. The White Paper will therefore be submitted at around the same 
time as the State budget is presented”35. Therefore, to some degree it overlaps and 
complements the Environmental Profile of the State Budget. However, while the 
Environmental Profile gives an overview of the financial resources allocated by each 
ministry to environmental purposes, the “State of the Environment report” systematically 
reports on actual emissions and their impact on the environment. In addition, it provides 
an overview of existing policies, describes central targets in the environmental policy, and 
gives valuable historical insight into the main priorities of the Ministry of Environment 
and the government’s environmental policies at the time of the report’s release.  
In a MONIT perspective it is therefore interesting to note that none of the three “State 
of the Environment reports” produced so far mentions innovation or related topics in a 
systematic manner. Further, none of them lists innovation or technology development in 
the overviews of main priorities.  
In the first two “State of the Environment” reports – White Paper 8 (1999-2000) and 
White Paper 24 (2000-2001) – innovation and technology development are only 
mentioned in relation to the KLIMATEK research program and the “Environmental 
fund” to reduce GHG emissions. Both initiatives are presented in detail below. 
When MoE published the most recent “State of the Environment” report (White Paper 
25 (2002-2003)) – in April 2003 – both the KLIMATEK program and the “Climate fund” 
had been terminated. The only references made to development of environmental 
technology are vague and related to increasing spending on research and development on 
“technology that reduces GHG emissions” and “environmentally friendly energy 
technology” (White Paper 25 (2002-2003): 101-103). Although not specifically mentioned 
in the document, the above probably concerns the “Renergi”36 research programme at the 
Research Council of Norway. The Renergi programme has a budget of NOK 150 million37 
for 2004 and NOK 175 million38 for 2005. Its main goal is “to develop knowledge and 
solutions as the basis for environment-friendly, efficient and effective management of the 
country's energy resources, security of supply and internationally competitive economic 
development related to the energy sector”39. The Renergi programme is indeed a major 
research program by Norwegian standards, and it might lead to innovation of green 
technologies. A number of ministries are contributing financially, including the MoE and 
                                              
35 Authors’ translation. Original Norwegian text: ”På lik linje med Nasjonalbudsjettet som viser 
Regjeringens opplegg for den økonomiske politikken og den økonomiske utviklingen, vil denne 
meldingen vise Regjeringens opplegg for den økologiske politikken og utviklingen i miljøet. 
Meldingen blir derfor lagt fram i nær tilknytning til framleggelsen av statsbudsjettet.” 
36 Renergi is a short for ‘ren energi’. The English equivalent is ‘Cleanergy’, a short for clean energy.  
37 Approximately EUR 17,65 million (exchange rate 8,5) 
38 Approximately EUR 20,6 million (exchange rate 8,5) 
39 More information at www.renergi.com (accessed May 24, 2004). 
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MoTI. The main contribution40, however, comes from the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy. 
6.4 The National Action Plan for Sustainable Development – NA21 
The existence of a long term national strategy for sustainable development is the first 
benchmark on the proposed checklist for a horizontal environmental policy integration 
(HEPI) introduced by Lafferty and Hovden (2003). NA21 is a long term strategy, but it 
remains to be seen to what degree it will have influence on green innovations. It has been 
criticized for being even less concrete than already published policy documents like those 
referred to in the NEMS (ProSus 2003). 
Development of environmental technologies is mentioned several times in NA21. 
Therefore, NA21, written by the Ministry of Finance, seems to place more emphasis on 
the issue than the State of the Environment reports and other administrative documents 
from the Ministry of Environment. However, it makes mention of only one specific 
instrument: “The government will (…) strengthen the basic research through the fund for 
research and innovation” (White Paper 1 (2003-2004): 195)41. This fund, established in 
1999 to fulfill the four politically defined fields for research (marine research, information 
and communication technology, medicine and health and research on the intersection 
between energy and the environment) is managed by the Department of Research and 
Education and has capital of NOK 31,8 billion. (MoER, St.prp. nr. 1 2002-2003)42. One-
third of the fund is channeled to the universities, and two-thirds of the fund is channeled 
through the Research Council of Norway. The fund has contributed to research on 
environmental issues. To be eligible for grants, research projects do not necessarily have to 
deal with either the environment or innovation.  Quality is the main criterion for funding. 
The universities and the Research Council of Norway are free to manage the funding 
according to their own priorities. Thus, a goal of the fund is to strengthen long term basic 
research in general, particularly in the four politically prioritized research areas. It cannot 
be perceived as an instrument for achieving innovation or environmental policy goals per 
se. 
Two more references to innovation are made in NA21. One is related to policy 
instruments for sustainable development (White Paper 1 (2003-2004): Ch 6.4.2). Under 
the section concerning Research and Development, increased use of “environmentally 
sound technology”43 is mentioned as decisive to reducing the negative environmental 
impact(s) of economic development44. It is stated that Norway can be an important 
contributor to the development of environmentally sound technology and that a long-term 
policy and policy instruments are crucial to making business and industry invest in such 
technology. Economic instruments (unspecified) are highlighted as having the potential to 
give strong incentives to the development and commercialization of green technology.  
                                              
40 To the author’s knowledge at least 80 % 
41 Information on the “Fund for Research and Innovation” is collected by Maria Gjølberg at ProSus. 
42 http://odin.dep.no/repub/03-04/pdf/ufd.pdf (Accessed March 18, 2004).  
43 In Norwegian: ”Miljøvennlig teknologi”. 
44 In Norwegian: “…Økt bruk av miljøvennlig teknologi (…) er avgjørende for å oppnå at 
sammenhengen mellom økonomisk utvikling og miljøbelastning reduseres.” (White Paper 1 (2003-
2004): 185) 
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The other reference to innovation in NA21 is in section 6.6.1 and regards the role of 
business and industry in sustainable production. Like White Paper 58, NA21 envisions the 
role of government as a passive one. NA21 states that the capacity of business and 
industry to innovate towards more sustainable production processes, and their willingness 
to assume social responsibility are decisive for achieving political goals. NA21 mentions 
that cooperation between business and industry and international organizations like 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)45, UN Global Compact46 
and ILO47 is important. Business and industry is urged to increase the use of 
environmental management systems and to strengthen the focus on developing 
environmentally sound technology, eco-design, environmentally friendly products and 
industrial ecology, which – according to NA21 – will increase the possibilities for 
exporting green technologies and environmentally sound solutions. Thus the somewhat 
reactive and passive position that the government has taken towards business and 
industry since the release of White Paper 58 in 1996, has not been challenged with the 
release of NA21. 
6.4.1 The status of green innovation efforts in Norwegian environmental politics for 
sustainable development 
After studying the most relevant environmental policy documents and initiatives it is 
possible to conclude that there is a lack of focus on green innovations. The environmental 
fund and the KLIMATEK programmes is mentioned in White Papers 58 (1996-97) and in 
the first two “State of the Environment” reports – White Paper 8 (1999-2000) and White 
Paper 24 (2000-2001). However – as previously stated – both of these were discontinued 
in January 2004. Still, the National Action Plan for Sustainable Development (NA21) 
mentions innovation more often, and seems to be more concerned about the need for 
environmentally sound innovations and technologies than White Paper 58 (1996-97). 
NA21 does not, however, mention any concrete measures to promote such green 
innovations. Furthermore, the only policy instrument mentioned in the latest “State of the 
Environment Report” published in the spring of 2003 – the Renergi programme – is not 
referred to in NA21. But NA21 refers to the Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy 
presented by Ministry of Trade and Industry a few weeks after NA21 was presented as 
part of the State Budget. It is stated that the comprehensive innovation policy plan will be 
consistent with the NA21 (White Paper 1 (2003-2004): Ch 6.5.6). Will this actually be 
followed up? In order to answer this question, we now turn to documents related to 
innovation policy which have been published by the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MoTI), “the Ministry of Innovation”. 
6.5 Recent governmental efforts to strengthen innovation policy in 
Norway 
In the introduction to a recent parliamentary bill presented by the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry on “Policy instruments for an innovative and creative business and industry” 
                                              
45 http://www.wbcsd.ch (Accessed March 15, 2004) 
46 http://www.unglobalcompact.org (Accessed March 15, 2004)  
47 http://www.ilo.org/ (Accessed March 15, 2004)  
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(Parliamentary Bill 51 (2002-2003), sustainable development is referred to as one of four 
main goals in the government’s economic policy. The other three goals are full 
employment, development of the welfare state and fair income distribution (Parliamentary 
Bill 51 (2002-2003): 5). The principal proposal in the bill is the establishment of 
“Innovation Norway”48, a new public entity aimed at promoting increased innovation in 
firms all over the country. We will make a detailed presentation of Innovation Norway in 
chapter 7. In this section we will describe references to green innovation in the latest two 
general innovation policy documents published by the Ministry of Trade and Industry: 
Parliamentary Bill 51 (2002-2003) and the Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive 
Innovation Policy, published in 2003. 
6.5.1 Parliamentary Bill 51 (2002-2003) “Policy instruments for an innovative and 
creative business and industry” 
According to Parliamentary Bill 51 (2002-2003) on “a creative and innovative 
business”, the main goal of the innovation policy is to contribute to increased innovation 
in business and industry in all parts of the country. This implies that regional policy also 
will focus on innovation.  With the exception of the introduction – as mentioned above – 
sustainable development is not mentioned in the parliamentary bill and there are few 
references to environmental matters, except for brief case studies of companies.  
The cases of five “success” companies are thoroughly presented in text boxes in the bill. 
These companies were, according to the bill, launched with support from governmental 
institutions. Three of the five companies, Repant49, ScanWafer ASA50 and Energos ASA51, 
have an environmental component in their business activities. Such a component was not, 
however, highlighted by or called for by MoTI in the parliamentary bill. Is this an 
indication that environmental issues are not considered important in innovation policies?  
When the parliamentary bill was debated in the Standing Committee on Trade and 
Industry, development of environmental technologies was discussed (Innst St nr 283 
(2002-2003): Ch 2.17). The Socialist Party (SV) proposed the establishment of a center to 
promote environmental technology (Dok nr 8: 93 (2002-2003)), but this was not 
supported by others, nor were alternatives proposed. Hence, it may appear that the 
Norwegian Parliament does not support, in its innovation policy, measures to promote 
green innovations. To get a more comprehensive picture of the situation, we thoroughly 
studied the latest innovation policy efforts presented by the government and the 
Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy. Our findings are presented in 
6.5.2. 
                                              
48 Innovation Norway is a merger of four previously independent public entities: The Norwegian 
Tourist Board, The Norwegian Trade Council, The Norwegian Industrial and Development Fund 
(SND) and the Government Consultative Office for Inventors (SVO). 
49 Repant AS delivers Reverse Vending Machines (RVM) for beverage containers. The company is 
especially focusing on the emerging German market. More info at: http://www.repant.com/ 
(accessed March 16th 2004). 
50 ScanWafer ASA is a world-leading producer of multicrystalline silica wafers for the solar cell 
industry. More info at: http://www.scanwafer.com/index.php/4740 (Accessed march 16, 2004). 
51 Energos ASA has developed and is producing advanced small scale waste-to-energy plants. More 
info at http://www.energos.com/ (Accessed March 16, 2004). 
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6.5.2 From Idea to Value – the Government’s Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation 
Policy52 
The plan was launched in October 2003. In January 2004 an impressive innovation 
conference with 700 participants was held with great festivity. In preparatory work during 
the summer of 2002, the plan was discussed in the government’s Research Committee53, 
where amongst others the Ministry of the Environment was represented. Some 13-14 
inter-ministerial groups were established and consulted. The official status of the 
document is “plan”, a type of document without administrative status. It will therefore not 
be given further political democratic treatment, nor will it necessarily be followed up or 
assessed. 
The government’s ambitious vision for its Innovation Policy is that “Norway is to be 
one of the most innovative countries in the world”. The Government has with the plan 
“embarked on the development of a comprehensive innovation policy”, a “long term and 
wide-ranging task” and “the first steps of a long journey” (MoTI 2003: 5). The plan “will 
contribute to a more coordinated and targeted effort, across various policy and 
administrative areas” (ibid: 5). The plan is signed by the Ministers of Local Government 
and Regional Development, Education and Research, Agriculture, Petroleum and Energy 
and Trade and Industry.  
The Minister of Environment, however, has not signed the plan. According to a MoTI 
representative54, the Ministry of Environment (MoE) has been aware of the process from 
its start when it was discussed in the government and the government’s Research 
Committee. However, it was not “considered necessary” that MoE participated. Further, it 
has not been a goal in itself to highlight certain issues or sectors in the plan. MoE has, 
however, had representatives on some of the interdepartmental committees working on 
the plan and has therefore had an opportunity to influence the process and the document.  
It is evident that environmental matters have not been important in the plan. 
Environment is mentioned in only a few places in the plan. The following is one example: 
“there are numerous examples of stricter international environmental requirements 
promoting innovation within businesses that have to adapt to a changed regulatory 
framework” (MoTI 2003: 10). Besides this rather reactive reference, environment is 
mentioned briefly in relation to the EU Lisbon Strategy and the development of an 
“efficient, safe and environmentally friendly transport system” in Norway.  
In conclusion, it would not be an exaggeration to state that the Plan for a 
Comprehensive Innovation Policy developed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry does 
not address environmental matters at all. Green innovations are not discussed and 
sustainable development is merely a rhetorical initial statement without further 
substantive follow-ups in terms of policy initiatives. 
                                              
52 The full English text of the plan is available at: 
http://www.odin.dep.no/archive/nhdvedlegg/01/10/fromi033.pdf (accessed March 15, 2004).  
53 Norwegian term: Regjeringens Forskningsutvalg (RFU) 
54 Telephone interview March 16, 2004.  
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6.6 Concluding remarks on horizontal policy integration for green 
innovations 
Innovation is hardly mentioned in the most important environmental since White 
Paper 46 of 1988-89. The only policy instrument that is left is the Renergi research 
programme. But, environmental issues are hardly mentioned in the most important and 
recent innovation policy documents either. The Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation 
Policy (HIP) does not consider environmental issues at all. This is interesting, especially 
when recalling that the NA21 stated that the HIP will be consistent with the NA21. The 
two documents were written and published at the same time and by the same 
government. Despite this, they have nothing in common at the policy level. We interpret 
this as an evidence of only minor horizontal integration between environmental and 
innovation policies. It is reasonable to conclude after studying these documents that 
innovation, environmental technologies and goals related to these issues are not priorities 
of the government. 
Using Lafferty’s and Hovden’s (2003) benchmarks, presented in section 2.3 as a 
reference, but modified to focus on green innovation, it is possible to summarize the 
horizontal dimension of environmental and innovation policies as follows:   
 
1. The existence of a long term national development strategy on green innovations  
A national action plan on sustainable development and a comprehensive plan on 
innovation are presented, but the plans are not related to each other. Consequently, there 
is no national development strategy for green innovations policy. However, inspired by 
the environmental technology action plan (ETAP) proposed by the EU Commission, MoE 
has asked the Pollution Control Board (SFT) to elaborate on the opportunities for 
developing an environmental innovation plan for Norway. For further details see the next 
chapter. 
 
2. The existence of a central authority specifically entrusted with the supervision, 
coordination and implementation of green innovation policy 
An expert group has been asked to develop national indicators to facilitate the realization 
of the objectives stated in NA21. Further, a committee with deputy ministers55 follows up 
the innovation policy plan, but MoE is not represented on this committee. In general no 
efforts are being made to supervise, coordinate or implement a green innovation policy in 
Norway.  
 
3. Central authority has clearly designated sectoral responsibility for achieving 
overarching goals on green innovations 
Sectoral responsibility is designated in only a few cases. We will review specific studies of 
relevant ministries and directorates in the next chapter. 
 
4. Timetables and targets for green innovation policy 
Within the field of environmental policy, the NEMS has specified eight policy priority 
areas with strategic objectives and operational national targets. The objectives and targets 
are not, however, related to innovation policy. Without supervision, coordination and 
                                              
55 Norwegian term: ”Regjeringens innovasjonsutvalg” 
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implementation, and without clearly designated sectoral responsibility from central 
authority, it is not surprising that there are neither timetables nor targets for the realization 
of a green innovation policy in Norway. 
 
5. Periodic reporting of progress on goals at both the central and sectoral levels 
Periodic progress reports were supposed to be part of the NEMS, but within the field of 
innovation no such reports are being made. Ministries – including the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry – have not reported on progress in the eight policy areas included in NEMS. 
Progress reports on innovation policy are also lacking. In short, periodic reporting does 
not exist.  
 
6. Active and monitored use of assessments of all governmental policies 
Regular environmental assessments are not used as a strategic tool in environmental 
politics. Alternative policy options are not considered. Rather the consequences of chosen 
policies are specified. Assessments remain technical, but even this is not considered with 
respect to green innovation policies. 
 
In conclusion, horizontal coordination of environmental and innovation policies is 
virtually nonexistent. Consequently there is significant room for improvement. We will 
elaborate further on the horizontal coordination in the final section of this report. Next 
we will document if there are policy instruments in use within the MoE and MoTI aiming 
at promoting green innovations.  
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7 ENVIRONMENTAL AND INNOVATION POLICY: 
THE VERTICAL DIMENSION 
While the previous chapter presented the horizontal dimension illustrated in figure 3, 
this chapter presents the vertically oriented initiatives and instruments of the Ministries of 
Environment and Trade and Industry. Taking each ministry’s Environmental Action Plan 
and their respective Environmental Profiles in the State Budget as points of departure, the 
instruments and institutions of each sector which are most relevant to initiatives for green 
innovations are presented below. 
The ministries’ Environmental Action Plans are an important part of the National 
Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS). The environmental profile of the State 
Budget is an account of each sector’s financial efforts on environmental issues. The efforts 
presented in this chapter are selected from each ministry’s presentation of relevant 
institutions in the above-mentioned documents. Assuming that the ministries would not 
downplay their initiatives on environmental issues, this selection is considered to be fully 
representative. Still we remain focused on the interface between environment and 
innovation – the sector-specific efforts of promoting green innovation.  
7.1 Ministry of Environment (MoE) 
7.1.1 The Environmental Action Plan presented by MoE 
The Ministry of Environment (MoE) is the coordinating body for environmental policy 
vis à vis the sectors and is responsible for the National Environmental Monitoring System 
(NEMS). The ministry’s own Environmental Action Plan was issued in 2003, after the 
plans of all the other ministries had been issued. Because it is relatively new we consider it 
to give an accurate impression of current Environmental Action Plans and political 
environmental priorities.  
The first section of the action plan gives a brief introduction to NEMS and defines the 
role of MoE. The second section gives a short introduction to MoE’s reporting and 
information initiatives, e.g. the Result Documentation System (RDS). The third section 
gives a thorough presentation of the eight Policy Priority Areas and MoE’s responsibility 
and policy instruments for all of them. This section is quite extensive because the Ministry 
is responsible for following up all the areas.  
Innovation or development of environmental technology are, however, not mentioned 
in relation to the national targets, prioritized policy instruments or responsibilities of the 
MoE. In the section on climate change it is stated that the most important policy 
instrument of the MoE is the CO2-tax, which covers about 65 per cent of all CO2-
emissions. A reference is also made to innovation and technical change. It is, however, 
clearly stated that the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MoPE) has the overall 
responsibility for budget allocations and development of energy technologies, including 
new renewable energies and natural gas power plants with CO2 handling (MoE 2003: 23).  
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Most of the policy instruments mentioned in MoE’s Environmental Action Plan are 
related to financial instruments, prohibitions and regulations. It is of course possible that 
taxes and emission control stimulates the development of more sound environmental 
technologies, but the Action Plan does not seem to anticipate such consequences. In short 
innovation is not mentioned. It is also worth noticing that the State Pollution Control 
Board and the Norwegian Foundation for Sustainable Production and Consumption 
(GRIP) is just briefly mentioned.  
7.1.2 The Environmental Profile of the State Budget 2004 
As referred to previously, all Ministries have to specify their budget allocations related 
to environmental matters. Not surprisingly, MoE’s Parliamentary Bill on the State Budget 
mostly concerns environmental issues. The 174-page document extensively covers all 
financial allocations of the Ministry, their purpose and to some degree their expected 
outcome. It gives a good, up-to-date account of the amounts allocated and their 
destination. This said, the quantified measure “financial allocations” will never be 
sufficient to assess the actual effect of the allocations, but the Environmental Profile can 
be read as a correction and “verification” to policy statements made.  
The impression of a lack of commitment to green innovation in the Environmental 
Action Plan of the Ministry of Environment is not altered when reading the 
Environmental Profile. Nevertheless, there are a few references to green innovation in the 
document. One of them is especially interesting: Bellona56, one of Norway’s most visible 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGO) has been granted resources to 
report on energy technology projects. Bellona does not, in contrast to other ENGOs, 
receive government funding due to government regulations prohibiting funding of 
organizations without dues-paying members57. But Bellona has previously received some 
funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and 
Ministry of Transport and Communication to specific projects, but never from the MoE.  
It is therefore interesting to note that MoE has allocated 900,000 NOK58 to Bellona to 
“…contribute to increased knowledge about more environmentally friendly energy 
technology and environmental technology” for fiscal year 2004 (MoE Parliamentary Bill 1 
(2003-2004): 113). The only prerequisite are that Bellona must apply the money to 
specific projects and that the organization must cooperate with relevant research units 
and industrial entities. The money is provided as a one time grant from an item for 
information on sustainable production and consumption. Bellona has applied several 
times for funding59 and hope to receive similar funding in the future. As of mid-March 
2004 Bellona had not decided how to use the funds.60  
Apart from some funding for the development of water cleansing technology, the 
Bellona-grant is the most specific allocation related to green innovations in MoE’s 
Environmental Profile. We will now consider two other actors that could be seen to have 
                                              
56 http://www.bellona.no/en/index.html (Accessed March 19, 2004) 
57 Bellona does not keep membership lists. It funds its activities from donations and partnerships 
with business and industry. 
58 Approximately 110,000 EUR (Exchange rate: 8,20). 
59 Telephone interview with Dag Hotvedt at Bellona on March 23, 2004. 
60 Telephone interview with Camilla Haugsten at Bellona on March 23, 2004.  
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innovation policy functions – GRIP and SFT. Both receive most of their funding from the 
MoE.  
7.1.3 GRIP 
GRIP – the Norwegian Foundation for Sustainable Production and Consumption61 – 
was founded as an independent foundation in 1995 by Torbjørn Berntsen, Minister of the 
Environment in the Brundtland Government62. GRIP is only briefly mentioned in MoE’s 
Environmental Action Plan and the Environmental Profile, but with 20 employees and an 
annual budget of NOK 33 million in 2002, it is an important initiative promoting a 
greening of trade and industry in Norway. GRIP works primarily with companies that do 
not pollute in a legal sense, but still have an impact on the environment through their 
means of transport, energy use, waste disposal and so forth. MoE is GRIP’s main financial 
contributor, e.g.  GRIP received approximately half of its income from MoE in 2002. 
Other big sources of funding are the Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development, which contributed NOK 6 million and Ministry of Petroleum and Energy,63  
which contributed almost NOK 3 million64. GRIP’s own income, from seminars, courses 
etc totaled NOK 7 million in 2002. MoTI has not contributed funds to GRIP and GRIP is 
not part of MoTI’s portfolio, but when sustainable or environmental production and 
consumption are discussed, MoTI frequently mentions GRIP as an example. 
According to Sigve Aasebø of GRIP,65 innovation is an underlying theme of GRIP’s 
activities given the references to innovation in Agenda 21 Chapter 4, but GRIP does not 
currently have many specific activities directly aimed at innovation and the environment. 
Mr Aasebø stresses, however, that in their view all the businesses they are working with, 
are involved in product development and therefore, depending on how one defines 
innovation, are also indirectly involved in green innovation.  
Noteworthy efforts by GRIP are its Glassbjørnen (Glass Bear) Award, and its (now 
terminated) EcoDesign and EcoBuild programmes. GRIP gives its Glassbjørnen Award 
annually. The award itself does probably not directly contribute to more green innovation, 
but the ceremony is a high-profile event in which the Minister of Environment and other 
prominent persons usually participate, and thereby gives much needed attention to green 
innovation. The Glassbjørnen award is given in five subcategories: innovation, eco-design, 
recycling, company of the year and price of honor. According to GRIP’s web site, the 
innovation award is given for work which stimulates innovation of environmental 
technology and which contributes to disseminating information about the significance and 
possibilities related to development and implementation of new environmentally friendly 
solutions.  
The EcoBuild programme, initiated by the building sector in 1998 and terminated in 
2002, was a heavyweight initiative with a NOK 170 million budget administered by GRIP. 
The programme’s goal was to increase eco-efficiency in the building and real estate 
                                              
61 For further details see: http://www.grip.no/ (Accessed May 28, 2004) 
62 According to GRIP’s Annual Report of 2001. 
63 Provided through the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) and Enova SF. 
64 According to Sigve Aasebø in a  Telephone interview May 28, 2004, the financial support from 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development and Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
in 2002, was mainly related to the EcoBuild programme.  
65 Telephone interview March 9, 2004. 
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industry. It was one of the first mainly environmentally oriented projects initiated by the 
building sector in Norway and was funded equally by the authorities and the building 
industry. The project was fairly highly profiled and members of its board of directors were 
key building industry executives.  
The EcoDesign programme encouraged product developers and industrial designers to 
take environmental concerns into account during the design process. The programme 
arranged conferences and courses, stimulated debates and published eco-design guidelines 
and manuals. The programme’s most significant contribution to innovation was to 
increase general awareness about eco-design, e.g. in the design schools. Although the 
EcoDesign programme was terminated in 200366, information it produced is still 
disseminated through courses arranged by GRIP and contact with design schools.  
7.1.4 Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT)  
The Pollution Control Authority (SFT) is a directorate with a staff of 270 under the 
Ministry of Environment. According to Per Døvle67 SFT is currently involved in only two 
efforts directly related to innovation: a database presenting best practices and lessons 
learned, and some preparatory work concerning a plan on environmental (technological) 
innovations commissioned by the MoE. It can of course be argued that SFT’s current 
work, such as issuing emission permits and drafting environmental regulations, indirectly 
contributes to the development of green innovations and particularly environmental 
technologies and important end-of-pipe solutions. We will, however, highlight examples of 
previous SFT work related to green innovations.  
According to Per Døvle of SFT68, SFT’s most important effort was its Program for 
Environmental Technology. During its existence (1990-1998) the program allocated 
approximately NOK 310 million69 to business and industry. The program’s aims were 
threefold: 1) to solve Norwegian environmental problems, 2) to achieve national 
environmental targets and 3) to stimulate Norwegian business and industry to develop 
environmental technology. About 60 per cent of the funds were used in a project the goal 
of which was to develop cleaner technology in Norwegian industry. The balance was 
offered as grants for the development of environmental technology in particularly 
pollution-intensive sectors and businesses. A special focus was placed on demonstration 
and pilot projects promoting radical technical and managerial innovations towards a 
greening of industry. Several processing industries such as pulp and paper benefited from 
this programme. 
Currently SFT’s engagement in green innovation is limited. The database on best 
practices and lessons learned70 is small and based on voluntary reporting. It is not 
particularly utilized by either SFT or external stakeholders. Still, the database consists of 
                                              
66 The final report from the programme is available at: 
http://www.grip.no/okodesign/dokumenter/2004-02-06_okodesignsluttrapp.pdf (Accessed May 28, 
2004) 
67 Telephone interview April 27, 2004. 
68 Telephone interview April 27, 2004. 
69 Equivalent to EUR 36,5 million (exchange rate: 8,5) 
70 http://www.sft.no/om_oss/godeeksempler/ Available in Norwegian only (Accessed April 28, 
2004) 
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about 40 initiatives ranging from recycling of waste in a kindergarten to CO2 injection at 
the Utsira geological formation in the North Sea.  
In January 2004 the EU Commission presented its Environmental Technologies Action 
Plan (ETAP), characterizing it as an effort to stimulate technologies for sustainable 
development.71 SFT have during spring 2004 done preparatory work for MoE on a report 
on environmental technology. In a horizontal policy integration perspective it is 
interesting that this happened less than two months after the presentation of the HIP. In 
fact, the ongoing work on green technology and response and follow up of the EU ETAP 
was initialized in February 2004 at the same time as the HIP was launched in a big public 
event – an event where the Minister of Environment did not even participate. This shows 
an evident lack of coherence and integration of innovation and environmental policies. At 
the same time the preparatory work on environmental technology confirms that MoE sees 
green technology as part of its sectoral responsibility. 
While the comprehensive innovation plan published by the MoTI leaves out 
environmental issues, and the MoE is not currently involved in efforts promoting 
innovations, it is promising that MoE is considering to publish an environmental 
technology action plan. According to ProSus’ sources, however, MoE’s efforts are a 
response to the EU ETAP rather than the Norwegian HIP and will therefore not 
necessarily be coordinated with the Ministry in charge of innovation policy, MoTI. But 
maybe the MoTI has its own vertical initiatives on green innovation? 
7.2 Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) 
7.2.1 The Environmental Action Plan presented by MoTI72 
To strengthen environmental policy integration within MoTI, the ministry, in response 
to a proposal included in White Paper 58 (1996-97), formulated an Environmental Action 
Plan for 2001-2005. It was introduced by the former minister of MoTI, Grete Knudsen, of 
the Labour Party. Her successor, Ansgar Gabrielsen of the Conservative Party has not 
made any efforts to revise this Environmental Action Plan. Consequently, we assume that 
it still reflects the political priorities of MoTI.  
In its Environmental Action Plan for 2001-2005 MoTI presents its perception of the 
major features of Norwegian environmental policy priorities. It seems like MoTI’s 
environmental focus has shifted from end-of-pipe solutions and clean-ups to prevention 
and changes in product and processing technologies. The plan presents changes in the 
regulatory framework. MoTI emphasizes that promising opportunities are created by 
voluntary agreements and self-regulatory efforts by individual firms and/or branch 
organizations. 
The action plan emphasizes the need to develop regulatory measures that are both 
governing and cost-effective. Governing-efficiency means that actual achievements of 
environmental policy objectives are made with a high degree of certainty while cost-
efficiency means that the expenses must be directed to areas with the highest degree of 
environmental gains. Also policy instruments outside the sectoral responsibility of MoTI 
                                              
71 More information at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/etap/ (Accessed May 4, 2004) 
72 This section is written with input from Maria Gjølberg at ProSus. 
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such as GRIP, the Eco-Lighthouse Program, Environmental Labeling ISO and EMAS. 
Despite the fact that this is an Environmental Action Plan from the “ministry of 
innovation”, no efforts on green innovations are proposed or referred to.  
7.2.2 The Environmental Profile of the State Budget 2004 
In the chapter on the Environmental Profile in MoTI’s Parliamentary Bill on the 2004 
State Budget (MoTI Parliamentary Bill nr 1 (2003-2004)) it is stated that the government 
will:  
“… motivate business and industry to be one step ahead in the implementation of environmental efforts. 
This will contribute to a better environment, lay the groundwork for Norwegian industry to develop 
advantages in environmental technologies and strengthen the long term competitiveness in business and 
industry”.  
It is further stated that 
“products and services that contribute to solve environmental challenges can be an important part of 
business opportunities and open new markets (environmental technology and -services)”. [Authors 
translation] (MoTI Parliamentary Bill nr 1 (2003-2004)) 
Three central aims of the Ministry’s environmental policy are identified in this chapter: 
− Contribute to a policy and resource use nationally and internationally that unite 
environmental considerations, trade policy and business considerations 
− To contribute to the development and use of environmentally friendly technology, products 
and services 
− To work actively in international organizations to reduce and prevent negative 
environmental impacts from shipping [Authors’ translation] 
However, very few specific initiatives for realizing these aims are presented in the 
chapter. Furthermore, it states that an important task for the Ministry is to contribute to 
the development of well-functioning markets for environmental products, processes and 
services, but it does not specify how this will be achieved. It further states that research 
and development on these issues is a high priority of the Research Council of Norway 
(RCN). RCN’s research program EMBa73 (Energy, Environment and Construction) is 
highlighted as an example of such R and D. According to the Environmental Profile, 
MoTI has allocated NOK 113,7 million74 to RCN for environmental research in 2004, of 
which NOK 27 million75 has been earmarked for the EMBa programme. 
Part of the environmental profile is to explain results from previous allocations of 
resources. According to the Ministry, all projects financed by SND/Innovation Norway 
have been assessed with regard to environmental issues. It is further stated that in 2002, 
312 million NOK76 was allocated to projects that contribute to increased eco-efficiency. 
This relatively high amount of money stems from the fact that when evaluating the 
projects financed by the SND, the SND executive officers tick a number of boxes that 
characterize the projects. If the environment box for some reason is ticked, it “counts” as 
an environmental project and is filed in the list projects subject to reporting in the 
                                              
73 ”Energi, miljø, bygg og anlegg”, http://www.program.forskningsradet.no/emba/ (Accessed March 
23rd 2004). EMBa is being merged into the Renergi programme. Visit www.renergi.com for more 
information. (Accessed May 25, 2004) 
74 Approximately 13,4 million EUR (Exchange rate: 8,50) 
75 Approximately 3,2  million EUR (Exchange rate: 8,50) 
76 Approximately 36,7  million EUR (Exchange rate: 8,50) 
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Environmental Profile, even though environmental issues were not really a central 
concern of the project. 
Our interpretation of the contents of the Environmental Profile suggests that the 
development of environmental technologies seems to be a central priority of MoTI. 
Nevertheless, we note that very few specific measures on green innovations are described 
in the Environmental Profile. In summary, the Environmental Profile of the State Budget 
2004 goes no further than White Paper 58 (1996-97): urging business and industry to 
innovate in an environmentally sounder way. 
We will next describe how specific initiatives by directorates under MoTI actually 
contribute to green innovations. 
7.2.3 Innovation Norway (including former SND) 
Innovation Norway was established January 1, 2004, as a direct consequence of 
Parliamentary Bill 51 (2002-2003). Innovation Norway spearheads the government’s 
innovation strategy. With 700 employees, and offices in all Norwegian counties and more 
than 30 foreign countries, it is a big organization by Norwegian standards. Innovation 
Norway was formed by merging into one organization The Norwegian Tourist Board, The 
Norwegian Trade Council, The Norwegian Industrial and Development Fund (SND) and 
the Government Consultative Office for Inventors (SVO). The merger seeks to achieve 
synergy and coordination of the innovation policy instruments of the former 
organizations. The inclusion of the Norwegian Trade Council will probably add value 
towards achieving Innovation Norway’s vision statement: “giving local ideas global 
opportunities”.  
SND was before the merger the MoTI agency mainly responsible for promoting 
business development and innovation. It is therefore especially relevant in a MONIT 
context and deserves a more thorough presentation. At the time it was merged into 
Innovation Norway, SND had significant influence on business development and 
innovation in Norway, especially in the regions. Except for an Environmental Fund, 
described below, there were only a few projects related to environmental issues in SND, 
and therefore it is not easy to assess the extent to which these projects influenced green 
innovations in Norway. According to Bjørn Nordby in Innovation Norway,77 SND 
“environment projects” in the 1990s were related to environmental warranties and bio-
energy in the agricultural sector. He also noted a rather vague request in SND’s 
“Executives Manual” to encourage environmental certification and that expenses related 
to environmental certification could be included in project applications78. As there a few 
current activities on green innovation by Innovation Norway let us now turn to a brief 
presentation of four green innovation efforts by former SND. 
First there was the project on environmental warranties79, initiated and financed by 
MoE but administered by SND. It ran from 1990 to 1996. It had an annual budget of 
NOK 75 million the first two years and NOK 100 million annually the remaining four 
                                              
77 Telephone Interview April 28, 2004.   
78 The request is made in the introduction of SND’s “Executives Manual” and references EMAS, 
ISO 14000 and the “Eco-Light house program”. 
79 All information regarding the project on environmental warranties and the executive officers 
committee was provided by Mr. Emil Jessen of Innovation Norway in a telephone interview May 
25, 2004. 
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years. The project was organized as a warranty provider to the banks whereby SND gave 
to the banks, on behalf of MoE, a so-called “simple guarantee”80 to cover the uninsured 
portions of loans. The applications were processed by SND, but formally approved by 
MoE. About 20 guarantees were issued annually. Included amongst the approved 
applications were prototype projects regarding waste recovery plants, bio-fuel plants, and 
one waste combustion plant. The commercial success of the warranty project, however, 
was limited, due mainly to over capacity in the waste recycling market and a government-
proposed domestic market (which never materialized) for water treatment.  
Second, a very interesting feature of the Norwegian initiatives from 1988 to 1998 to 
develop environmental technologies was an inter-institutional committee consisting of 
executive officers from SND, SFT, RCN, NTC and some ministries. It was headed by Tor 
Petter Johnsen from RCN and met on a quarterly basis. According to SND’s Emil Jessen, 
the committee managed and coordinated the applications for funding for environmental 
technology projects, both related to SFT’s program for environmental technologies, the 
research programs managed by the RCN and the initiatives managed by SND. Although 
the committee was evaluated as very successful (Hagen et al 1996) it ceased to exist once 
funding for environmental technology programs dried up.   
Third, a project on bio-energy in the agricultural sector started in 2003 and will 
continue for the foreseeable future. It subsidizes 25 per cent of the cost of machinery to 
make chips for bio-combustion plants. It also subsidizes small combustion plants 
producing heat for various recipients. For 2004 the budget for bio-energy in the 
agricultural sector is NOK 18 million81 and the project aims at involving farmers in a 
wider segment of the agricultural value chain by adding forestry products. This expansion 
is in accordance with MoA’s vision of stimulating the agricultural sector to engage in 
additional activities to ensure new (and steadier) sources of income. 
Fourth, a very important and interesting initiative is “The Environmental Fund”, the 
most recent action of significance undertaken in Norway to promote green innovations. It 
is the biggest effort ever undertaken to promote green technology in Norway and deserves 
a somewhat thorough presentation: The fun was proposed by the Jagland Government in 
1997 as part of a bigger package82 when the government announced, to a great deal of 
controversy, that it would propose construction of two natural gas energy plants in 
Norway. Although the fund was coordinated by SND, it was fully financed by MoE, and 
SFT acted as advisor and gave assessments of specific project proposals. The original 
proposal in the State Budget of 1997-98 was to allocate NOK 500 million83 for low-cost 
loans to industry, including 100 million NOK to cover financial losses. The Jagland 
Government resigned before the fund was approved by the Parliament. Eventually, the 
revised State Budget proposed half that amount (NOK 250 million). This amount was 
distributed to 64 companies with a total investment frame of NOK 855 million84, thereby 
contributing with NOK 208 million, or 24 per cent, of the total investments.  
The fund’s purpose was to “… ensure financing of projects contributing to reductions 
in green house gas emissions and other polluting discharges that would otherwise not be 
                                              
80 Norwegian term: ”simpel kausjon” 
81 EUR 2,1 million (exchange rate 8,5) 
82 The KLIMATEK programme at the Research Council of Norway was also part of the package. 
83 250 million NOK in 1998 (Approximately EUR 59 million, exchange rate 8,5) 
84 Approximately EUR 104 million (Exchange rate 8,20) 
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financed in the capital market”. The first of three main conclusions in an evaluation of the 
fund by Hartmark Consulting (2003), however, was that it to a lesser degree than 
expected been triggering for the projects. According to Bjørn Nordby85 this conclusion was 
puzzling to Innovation Norway because most programs are evaluated to have a positive 
effect.  
The main goal of the fund was “to stimulate business and industry to adopt and 
develop new environmental technology”. However, only 7 of the 64 projects, accounting 
for 6 per cent of the funds allocated, were actually concerned with development of new 
environmental technology. Therefore, the second main conclusion of the Hartmark 
evaluation was that the fund had not reached its goal of supporting projects contributing 
to innovation and/or development of environmental technology. The evaluation did, 
however, state that such projects probably were the riskiest. Mr. Nordby explained that 
SND actually received very few applications from projects concerned with development 
of new environmental technology, and that he was not aware of any “good” projects being 
rejected.  
The third main conclusion of the Hartmark evaluation is positive: the targets for 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were fulfilled, and the national deposit systems 
and incentives to reduce waste accumulation in all sectors have contributed to 
establishment of new businesses and systems. Most financed projects had to do with 
reducing emissions of GHGs, which was in accordance with the fund’s guidelines. 
The overall conclusion of the Hartmark Consulting evaluation was that the funded 
projects had positive environmental effects, but that they contributed little to the 
development of new technology. Mr. Nordby states86 that these effects were not surprising 
as improved environment more than business development was the goal of the 
Environmental Fund. In a Norwegian context the establishment of the Environmental 
Fund by the Jagland Government was considered quite offensive, all the more so when 
plans were announced to expand it. In the first Bondevik Government, however, the fund 
was disbanded. 
Leaving the Environmental Fund let us now turn to MoTI’s Environmental Profile in 
the State Budget (MoTI Parliamentary Bill 1 (2003-2004): 43): In the Environmental 
Profile it is stated that 8 per cent of SND’s financial allocations in 2002 went to projects 
“improving eco-efficiency through improvement of existing products, production 
processes and/or system solutions”87 and that “all projects financed by SND are assessed 
in relation to environmental issues”. This seems quite impressive and according to Mr. 
Nordby, the number had risen to 10 per cent in 2003. It is, however, difficult to assess 
both the quality of improvements resulting from such projects, and whether 10 per cent of 
the projects actually were related to innovation. The impressive numbers referred to are 
unfortunately misleading. The numbers are produced when SND’s executive officers tick 
boxes on a form categorizing the projects and do as such not give any indication on for 
example how much and to what extent a product is improved. In SND’s executives 
manual it is stated that the “environment box” should be ticked when: 
“The project leads to higher eco-efficiency through improvement of products, production processes 
and/or system solutions. 
                                              
85 Telephone interview April 28, 2004. 
86 ibid 
87 Authors translation. 
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The box should be ticked for projects that are more or less environmentally grounded, for instance: 
- Projects that have as a primary concern to develop/commercialize business ideas related to 
environmental technology 
- Investment/development projects that have as one of their goals to improve the environmental 
quality of a company’s products, production processes or other related aspects”88 
There is no specific requirement that Innovation Norway give priority to 
“environmental projects” when it decides on funding applications, but according to SND’s 
“Executives Manual” (which is still in use in Innovation Norway) Innovation Norway is 
obliged to address environmental issues in relation to external risks and possibilities89 as 
well as in a final section on environmental concerns90.  
Innovation Norway is in many ways still in its infancy. The publishing of an action plan 
– maybe also including environmental matters – is expected during fall 2004. The bio-
energy program has been extended. In addition, renewable energy projects are being 
planned as a result of the internationalization of one of Norway’s most important sectors 
– the energy sector. As of April 2004 the project group has arranged seminars and 
workshops with stakeholders and possible projects are being assessed. According to Bjørn 
Nordby, the renewable energy project lacks funding but will be carried forward, although 
it is not yet clear how.  
7.2.4 Other initiatives by MoTI 
Argentum Fondsinvesteringer AS 
Argentum Fondsinvesteringer AS is a government-owned investment company, and 
“the only pure fund-of-fund investor in the private equity sector in Norway”91. After the 
Norwegian Parliament passed White Paper 38 (2000-2001) on “Organizing of Investment 
Companies”, Argentum was established in 2001 with total assets of NOK 2,45 billion92. 
Seven investment areas were chosen93, amongst them the environment.   
Due to its mandate as a fund-of-fund investor, however, Argentum is dependent on the 
portfolios of other Norwegian funds to make their investments and according to 
Argentum’s CTO Nils Vogt94 there are no funds in Norway having a purely environmental 
profile, but of the 25 funds registered at The Norwegian Venture Capital Association95 
there are 7 which have environment-related investments. As of January 2004, Argentum 
was involved in five funds investing in energy, ICT and life sciences. In Argentum’s own 
case, it has no investments related to green innovations, except for investments in the 
company Pure Process Solutions (part of the EnergiVekst Fund96), a company involved in 
                                              
88 Authors translation 
89 From ”krav til innstilling”, requirement  4, ”eksterne forhold”, in SND’s Executives Manual.” 
90 From ”krav til innstilling”, requirement  10.3 ”Miljøvurderinger”, in SND’s Executives Manual.” 
91 Citation from Argentum’s web pages (http://www.argentum.no/index.php?lang=eng . Accessed 
Sept 15, 2004) 
92 EUR 299 million (Exchange rate 8,20). 
93 Technology/ICT, Marine, Bio technology, Energy, Environment, Maritime and Health/medicine 
(Parliamentary Bill 51 (2002-2003): Ch 6.8). 
94 Telephone interview Jan 23, 2004 and E-mail to the authors May 28, 2004. 
95 Norwegian term: “Norsk Venture Kapital Forening”. For more information visit: 
http://www.nvca.no/ (Accessed June 1, 2004) 
96 For more info visit http://www.energivekst.no/ (Accessed June 1, 2004) 
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cleansing technology for water and oil within the petroleum sector. Vogt emphasizes97 that 
Argentum is a purely commercial actor, which does not have a mandate favoring certain 
sectors or technologies.  
SIVA SF 
SIVA (The Industrial Development Corporation of Norway) was founded in 1968 as a 
national actor to develop innovation networks throughout the country and has the role of 
catalyst and investor to foster innovation and business development. In 2003 it was 
transferred from the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development to be fully 
owned by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) in 2003. “Since 1994, SIVA has 
been gradually changing from being a state-owned company managing industrial property 
to being a modern innovation and investment company”98. SIVA’s basic strategy is to 
develop strong local and regional business and industry clusters in Norway. It has 40 
employees, total assets of EUR 440 million and invested EUR 33 million in 200299.  
According to SIVA’s Terje Sæterli100 the main innovation activities of SIVA involve 
programmes for business gardens and incubators. SIVA has, however, no specific 
environmental requirements for providing funding and support. SIVA’s decisions on 
funding are based mainly on the economic merits of each project. Some regional political 
considerations are taken into account, too.  
7.3  Concluding remarks on vertical policy integration for green 
innovations 
Although there have been some interesting environmental technology projects and 
initiatives the last 15 years, there are few current projects, either ongoing or in the 
pipeline. SFT’s program for environmental technology, and SND’s program on 
environmental warranties and its Environmental Fund were interesting and fairly big 
projects, but are now terminated and there are no evidence that they will be taken up 
again. It is, however, interesting to note that all the initiatives related to environmental 
issues, managed by former SND were financed by the Ministry of Environment, not the 
Ministy of Trade and Industry because SND (and now Innovation Norway) always has 
been in MoTI portfolio.  
As we did with HEPI in Chapter 6, we will now apply Lafferty’s and Hovden’s (2003) 
benchmarks presented in chapter 2.4 to the vertical dimension – VEPI – again modifying 
them to focus explicitly on green innovation. Lafferty and Hovden (2003) state that the 
key factor is whether or not a strategic Environmental Action Plan exist. However, the 
plan itself will be of limited importance unless it properly identifies and then assesses the 
key environmental challenges for the relevant sector or if it fails to stipulate realistic 
targets, benchmarks and measures for objective assessment of implementation results 
                                              
97 Telephone interview Jan 23, 2004. 
98 Authors translation. Original text: ”Det siste 10-året er SIVA forandret fra å være en statlig forvaltningsetat for 
industrieiendom til dagens moderne innovasjons- og investeringsselskap”. Source: 
http://www.nhnett.net/C125654E0043B247/8486CEFD06DD6D7041256802004F331F/D9E6B2C0FDD728834
12568B4005E62C8?OpenDocument  (Accessed Sept 15, 2004) 
99 Information collected from SIVA’s web-page: http://www.siva.no/ (Accessed March 8, 2004). 
100 Telephone interview March 9, 2004. 
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concerning prevailing environmental challenges related to the sector or Ministry in 
question.  
Recalling that there is little emphasis on innovation and development of environmental 
technology in the horizontal steering documents referred to in chapter 6 and that there 
are not yet any sectoral action plans for green innovation in place, it is not surprising that 
the findings on the vertical dimension (as proposed by Lafferty and Hovden (2003)) are 
limited: 
 
1. An initial mapping and specification of the major challenges and opportunities 
related to green innovation relevant to the sector 
We are not aware of any such mappings or specifications. 
 
2. Formulation of a sectoral green innovation action plan 
A sectoral green innovation plan is not in place. SFT has done some preparatory work 
for the MoE on environmental technologies. This process has just started and it is not sure 
what the outcome will be. It is, however, highly unlikely that a sectoral green innovation 
action plan will be produced.  
 
3. Consistent and regular employment of both environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA) for all sectoral policy 
decisions related to innovation 
We are not aware that any such assessments have been conducted. 
 
4. Timetables and quantitative, indicator-based targets stipulated in the sectoral green 
innovation action plan – or elsewhere 
There is currently no sectoral green innovation action plan or other strategies related to 
green innovation in Norway and hence no timetables or indicator based targets stipulated. 
 
5. Regular reporting of the state of the green innovation relevant policies within the 
sector 
As there seems to be no relevant policies promoting green innovation, there is no 
reporting and nothing to report on. 
 
One would have to conclude from the above that the degree of policy integration of 
environmental and innovation policies in Norway is low. There are a few initiatives in 
place, but they are insignificant and not related either to each other or to any strategy. 
There are no strategic actions or plans for green innovation. It further seems that during 
the last decade the focus on green innovation and environmental technologies has been 
reduced. However, Innovation Norway is still in its infancy. As of spring 2004, it is 
working on strategy papers that might place greater emphasis on green innovation.  
It is clear from the material presented in the previous two chapters that in MoE and 
MoTI there is plenty of room for improvement regarding green innovation. There are, 
however, initiatives from other ministries that slightly moderate this picture. The following 
section will present some of these initiatives and two case studies of green technologies. 
Then we will in chapter 10 conclude by reviewing policy recommendations.  
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8 ADDTIONAL POLICY EFFORTS ON GREEN 
INNOVATIONS: MOSTLY FISCAL MEASURES  
There are a number of regulatory approaches to promote green innovation. The 
concern of this report is to identify the existence and dynamics of the interface between 
environmental and innovation policy efforts. Is there a green innovation policy in 
Norway? Based on studies of the efforts promoted by MoE and MoTI the answer is, 
“No”. Few efforts are currently ongoing, and those efforts that could have made a 
difference – such as the Environmental Fund (Statens Miljøfond) – have not received 
additional funding. However, the recent efforts of RCN’s Renergi, including KLIMATEK, 
may represent a new window of opportunity. 
Does the lack of a green innovation policy imply that Norway has not implemented 
any green innovation policy efforts at all? As referred to in chapter 3, there has been a 
clear shift in environmental political priorities from administrative rationalism towards 
ecological modernisation. Firms are requested to improve their performances and the use 
of economic instruments has been strengthened. In our search for green innovation policy 
efforts, we will therefore briefly present both existing environmental taxes and the fiscal 
incentives for R&D proposed by SkatteFUNN.  
The focus so far in this report has been on the ministries in charge of environmental 
and innovation policies, MoE and MoTI. We now expand this focus to include the fiscal 
measures of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). However, there are other ministries and 
directorates that may play an influential role in promoting green innovation. We therefore 
also briefly present Enova, a state enterprise under the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
(MoPE). Enova has financial resources available to promote green innovation and an 
explicit aim to promote new renewable energy sources – a crucial reference with respect 
to green innovations. Finally, we will present Green National Government in Norway – 
Green Government101 – and the potential for the state to be a green supplier and 
consumer, creating new domestic markets and triggering green innovation in industry and 
business. 
8.1  Application of environmental taxes  
According to White Paper 58 (1996-97), the government wanted to change the tax 
system in such a way that it would become more profitable for firms to be 
environmentally conscious. As stated on page 30 of the White Paper, “industrial policies 
will be developed within the context of sustainable development”. This stands in contrast 
to the more theoretical reasoning of the Green Tax Commission (GTC), appointed by the 
government in December 1994 at the request of the Norwegian Parliament during budget 
debates. A major objective of GTC was to discuss the long term role of fiscal measures in 
promoting increased employment and an improved environment (NOU: 9 1996). The 
GTC argued quite convincingly that Norway could increase both economic growth and 
                                              
101 In Norwegian termed ”Grønn Stat”. 
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environmental protection through extended CO2 taxation of all polluters. However, such a 
fiscal approach would be financially detrimental for those industries not having short-term 
economic or technical opportunities to replace the processing technologies causing CO2 
emissions. One example is the primary aluminum industry (Ruud 2002). 
When the GTC arguments became more manifest through a proposed extension of 
fiscal taxation, the Brundtland Government appointed another commission to propose a 
strategy to make industries green without either reducing their competitiveness or 
changing the then existing tax system. This commission, the Industry Structure 
Commission (ISC), had 12 members, all of whom came from industry and business. There 
were no representatives on the commission from MoE, the research community, or 
environmental NGOs. In contrast, of the 16 members of the Green Tax Commission only 
2 came directly from industry and business. This commission’s work was presented in a 
government report in 1996 entitled “Competition, Knowledge and Environment” (NOU 
23 1996). The ISC proposed a number of measures that stood in striking contrast to the 
macro-based approach of the Green Tax Commission. The ISC argued, in line with the 
reasoning of ecological modernization, that in the long run there are no serious conflicts 
between a reasonable industrial policy and good environmental policy. Consequently, to 
promote sustainable development, the ISC did not perceive any need for forced structural 
changes through fiscal measures – like CO2 taxation – to alter the composition and 
performance of Norwegian industry. In principle the ISC supports fiscal environmental 
measures because they could create incentives to develop and use product and process 
technologies that are more environmentally sound and cost efficient. However, the GTC 
proposal for an extension in the fiscal tax base to include processing industries like 
aluminium producers was strongly rejected. As of April 2004 there is a tax on 64 per cent 
of all CO2 emissions in Norway102. 
8.2 SkatteFUNN103 
SkatteFUNN is currently one of the most important instruments in Norwegian 
innovation policy. Its main goal is to increase and improve R&D activities in business and 
industry through more systematic and integrated commercial efforts. The program was 
established in 2001and implemented in 2002 as a follow up to the FUNN-program. It is 
administered by the RCN and Innovation Norway. Big enterprises can have up to 18 per 
cent and small and medium sized enterprises (SMB)104 can have up to 20 per cent of their 
R&D expenditures reimbursed through tax-reductions. If a company acts alone, the 
maximum size of the R&D project eligible for support is NOK 4 million. If a company 
cooperates with an approved research institution the maximum is NOK 8 million. 
SkatteFUNN is one of the government’s means for reaching by 2005 the OECD-
mandated level of R&D. This would mean an increase from today’s level of 1,62 per cent 
                                              
102 For more information on this, please visit 
http://www.environment.no/templates/PageWithRightListing____2328.aspx  (Accessed May 4, 
2004) 
103 Information in this section on SkatteFUNN is gathered from http://www.skattefunn.no 
(Accessed March 31, 2004). Information in English is available here: 
http://jaguar.intrapoint.no/skattefunn_v2/index.php?kat=English (Accessed Sept 24, 2004) 
104 Less than 250 employees, less than EUR 40 million in annual turnover, and less than 25-percent-
owned by a big enterprise. 
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of GDP to 2,3 per cent of GDP. In 2002 more than 3100 applications for reimbursement 
of R&D expenditures were submitted, and 2670 were approved. The approved projects 
had R&D expenditures totaling NOK 4,5 billion, which as a result of the programme 
resulted in approximately NOK 760 million in tax reductions (MoTI Parliamentary Bill 1 
2003-2004: 119). In contrast to the FUNN programme (SkatteFunn’s predecessor) that 
had limits on its total allocations, SkatteFUNN allows any business to be eligible for tax 
reductions as long as its projects are approved by RCN or Innovation Norway. In a 
MONIT-context, however, one must note that there are no specific criteria related to 
environmental issues in the SkatteFUNN program. The program does therefore not 
contribute to an integration of environmental and innovation policies. 
8.3 ENOVA 
ENOVA SF, established in 2001, is a state enterprise fully owned by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy (Ot Prp 35 (2000-2001). According to ENOVA’s web site105 its 
“main mission is to contribute to environmentally sound and rational use and production 
of energy, relying on financial instruments and incentives to stimulate market actors and 
mechanisms to achieve national energy policy goals”. ENOVA’s major goal is to save 10 
Twh by 2010 through stimulating cost-effective and environmentally sound investments in 
households and business and industry. According to statements on their web site, the 
establishment of Enova SF signals “a shift in Norway’s organization and implementation 
of its energy efficiency and renewable energy policy. By gathering strategic policy 
responsibilities in a small, flexible and market-oriented organization, Norway has wanted 
to create a pro-active agency that has the capacity to stimulate energy efficiency by 
motivating cost-effective and environmentally sound investment decisions. Enova SF 
enjoys considerable freedom with regard to the choice and composition of its strategic foci 
and policy measures”.  
To achieve ENOVA’s objectives, “the Norwegian Parliament has set up an Energy 
Fund and indicated grants within a framework of up to NOK 5 billion106 over a ten-year 
period”.  The funding will come from a levy on electricity distribution tariffs and from 
ordinary grants in the State Budget. ENOVA is one of the government’s most important 
instruments in the areas of energy conservation and utilization of more environmentally 
friendly energy sources.  
Currently, organizations are invited to apply for funding from programmes in the 
following areas:  
1. Heat distribution (infrastructure) and heat generation based on renewable energy 
sources, such as bio energy and waste: Enova SF can contribute up to 15% of the 
total project cost.  
2. Energy End Use:  
a. Industry: Energy savings and efficiency improvements in industry  
b. Energy management in large commercial buildings  
c. Energy management in small commercial buildings  
                                              
105 Most information in this section is collected from ENOVA’s website 
http://www.enova.no/?itemid=425 (Accessed Sept 24, 2004) 
106 Approximately EUR 560 million (Exchange Rate 8,50) 
 70 
d. Retrofitting of more efficient street lighting  
e. Energy management in residential buildings 
3. Wind energy: The maximum subsidy level is 10% of the total investment, but the 
programme also aims to demonstrate the viability and aid commercialization of 
wind technology, which is particularly suitable for Norwegian climate conditions, 
by providing a maximum of 60% of approved project costs. 
4. Renewable energy (other than wind): The aim is to improve deployment of 
renewable energy technologies. Initially priority has been placed on solar space 
and solar water heating and projects that combine solar heating with energy 
sources other than electricity.   
 
Enova has also been given the task of commercializing natural gas, but with White 
Paper 47 (2003-2004) the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has taken a separate 
initiative to set up an innovation body in the Grenland District in Telemark County to 
promote an environmentally sound natural-gas generating plant with CO2 handling. 
Enova will apparently not be involved in the technological development that facilitates a 
more environmentally sound consumption and utilization of the same natural gas. This 
reflects lack of vertical policy integration.  
In a MONIT context it is interesting to note that ENOVA SF is focusing on 
commercialization of new renewable energy technologies. Consequently ENOVA has not 
been involved in inventions and technology development as the efforts promoted by 
ScanWafer and Shecco Technology, presented in section 9 below.  
A remaining challenge is how to stimulate demand for green innovations. Can the 
public authorities play a role by creating a market for green innovations through a 
greening of governmental purchasing activities? 
8.4 Green Government 
“Green Government” is a state environmental management scheme based on the 
principles formulated in ISO-14000 and EMAS107. Its goal is to implement environment 
into the government management systems. Green Government started out as a pilot 
project in 1998-2001 covering 10 institutions. The project was considered successful and 
showed that the potential for realizing environmental gains in governmental institutions 
was significant. Four focus areas were selected: procurement, waste management, energy 
and transport. Initially the ministries lead the way, starting implementation in 2002. By 
the end of 2005, however, all national government institutions are to implement Green 
Government. The national authorities are also, through § 6 in the Law on public 
procurement108, instructed to take environmental considerations in their purchases. 
The Environmental Action Plans formulated by both MoTI and MoE refer to the 
Green Government project. Green Government has a particular focus on public 
procurement policy and on the extent to which environmental considerations can be 
                                              
107 More information on Green Government at www.gronnstat.no. An English pamphlet presenting 
the scheme is available at http://www.odin.dep.no/filarkiv/179934/Info-brosjyre-engelsk.pdf (Both 
accessed May 27, 2004.) 
108 Available online (in Norwegian only) at: http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19990716-069.html 
(Accessed May 27, 2004). 
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included in the decision-making process. The Environmental Action Plan of MoTI refers 
to a purchasing manual that the ministry has been responsible for developing109. The 
manual will help public servants to formulate strategic and specific environmental 
prerequisites to suppliers. MoTI refers to the Green Government project, but underlines 
that this must be followed up with a general strengthening in the market demand for 
innovative solutions creating positive environmental benefits. As formulated: “When the 
government is increasing its demand for ‘green solutions’, it is probable that business also 
must increase its activity and particular suppliers of such solutions” (MoTI 2001: 28). 
In contrast to the efforts formulated specifically with respect to the eight priority areas, 
the efforts promoting Green government are not connected to the NEMS framework. 
Green Government, however, is mentioned in most of the sectoral Environmental Action 
Plans, but it is never related to green innovation policy. 
 
                                              
109 The manual is now published and available (unfortunately in Norwegian only) at 
http://odin.dep.no/archive/nhdvedlegg/01/10/ferdi044.pdf (Accessed May 27, 2004) 
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9 TWO RELEVANT BUSINESS CASES 
This section is based on ongoing research at ProSus related to the CondEcol project110. 
We will present two Norwegian environmental innovations promoted by Shecco 
Technologies111 and ScanWafer112.  
SheccoTM Technology is a part of Hydro Pronova AS, which is the venture company of 
Norsk Hydro ASA. Shecco promotes a heating and cooling technology based on natural 
CO2. The technology will in this report be referred to as “Shecco Technology” or “CO2-
technology . It offers energy-efficient and environmentally friendly solutions for stationary 
and mobile heating and cooling devices. It represents a potential significant contribution 
to reduced greenhouse-emission from mobile and stationary air-conditioners and tap 
water heaters due to its energy efficiency and the replacement of HFC’s, a potent 
greenhouse gas (GHG), with CO2.  
Renewable Energy Corporation (REC) is the only company in the world that covers 
the whole value chain of solar energy – from the manufacturing of solar grade polysilicon 
feedstock to the marketing of photovoltaic (PV) systems to the consumer. By 
technological innovation, economics of scale and synergies along the whole value chain, 
REC offers high-performing PV components and systems at prices which continue to go 
down. In this report we have chosen to focus on the production of multicrystalline silica 
wafers, manufactured by ScanWafer, a company fully controlled by REC. The silica wafers 
constitute about 30 per cent of the total cost of a solar panel. They are the parts that 
determine the panel’s energy output. Hence, the wafers are crucial to making solar energy 
a competitive technology.  
We will present the most important technological features of the innovations by 
Shecco Technology and ScanWafer and will briefly describe when and how the 
environmental benefits of these innovations become evident. We will trace the history of 
both companies from their respective R&D phases to the marketing of their inventions.   
9.1 Shecco heating and cooling technology 
Shecco Technology was founded in 1987, at a time when HFCs were seen as a possible 
solution to a major environmental problem – the hole in Earth’s ozone layer. The 
Montreal Protocol, signed that same year, was a tremendous breakthrough of 
international environmental agreements because it curbed emissions of ozone-depleting 
substances.113 Today the ozone layer is still being depleted, but measurements suggest that 
atmospheric concentrations of ozone-depleting substances have peaked and begun to 
                                              
110 More information at: http://www.prosus.uio.no/industri/condecol/index.htm (Accessed April 
30, 2004) 
111 http://www.shecco.com (Accessed April 30, 2004) 
112 http://www.scanwafer.com/ (Accessed April 30, 2004) 
113 Chlorinefloridecarbons (CFC’s) etc. 
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decline. Consumption of ozone-depleting substances is dropping rapidly and the ozone 
layer is expected to recover by 2050114. 
The hole in the ozone layer was regarded as one of the major environmental disasters 
of our time and urgent measures against ozone-depleting substances were taken. 
Alternatives (HCFCs and HFCs) to ozone-depleting substances had, however, detrimental 
side effects that were undercommunicated during negotiations of the Montreal Protocol. 
These alternatives are greenhouse gases (GHGs), which contribute significantly to global 
warming. Hence, the Montreal protocol represented a major ecological challenge. One 
environmental problem (emission of ozone-depleting substances) was solved while a new 
was created (green house gas emissions)115.  
The late Professor Gustav Lorentzen and his team at The Foundation for Scientific and 
Industrial Research at the Norwegian Institute of Technology (SINTEF) were aware of the 
adverse environmental consequences caused by the switch to HFCs so they studied 
alternative refrigerants: natural fluids like ammonia, hydrocarbons (HC)116, water and 
carbon dioxide (CO2). They found that CO2 had clear advantages over the other working 
fluids due to its heating and cooling performances, but also because it was non-flammable 
and non-toxic. Knowledge about CO2’s cooling performance, however, was not new. They 
were discovered in the 1850s.  
The first cooling system based on CO2 was built in 1869 and the use of CO2 in cooling 
systems later came into widespread use. In the 1940s, however, CO2 cooling systems 
disappeared from the market, mainly due to technical problems and the invention of new 
fluids like chlorinefloridecarbons (CFCs). Due to the high pressure required in CO2 
cooling systems, leakages were a serious problem. In secrecy Lorentzen and his team 
started to develop a prototype cooling system based on CO2 under the name “R2000”. 
They solved the leakage problem using a “method for operating a vapour compression 
cycle under trans- or supercritical conditions”. This basically involved closing the CO2 
circuit with an expansion valve. In 1989 they filed a patent application117 and a new era 
for CO2 as refrigerant began. 
9.1.1 Eco-efficient technological features 
Shecco Technology118 is an energy-efficient and environmentally friendly heating and 
cooling technology based on natural CO2. The technology can be used in mobile air 
conditioners (MACs) for passenger cars, or in both mobile and stationary refrigeration 
units, e.g. for food storage. Because the technology allows for a mobile air-conditioner to 
be “reversed”, the unit can be used for heating, e.g. in cars or to heat water. The use of 
CO2 as a refrigerant significantly reduces global warming because it replaces the potent 
                                              
114 Source: State of the Environment Norway (http://www.environment.no/) Accessed April 30, 
2004. Another valuable source of information on the ozone layer is 
http://www.unep.org/ozone/Public_Information/index.asp (Accessed April 30, 2004) 
115 Note that CFC’s were, in addition to depleting the ozone layer, also GHGs. 
116 i.e. propane 
117 The patent documents are available at http://www.shecco.com/patents/EP424474_B2.pdf 
(Accessed April 30th 2004) 
118 Visit Shecco Technology’s website http://www.shecco.com for more information (accessed 
March 26th 2004) 
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GHG, HFC 134a119, a refrigerant with a global warming potential (GWP) of 1300120. By 
comparison CO2 has a GWP of 1.  
Shecco Technology is suitable for a variety of heating and cooling applications. 
Currently Shecco Technology is used in residential tap water heating in Japan, in 
commercial refrigeration in supermarkets, soft drink vending machines, and mobile air-
conditioning (MACs). The main ecological advantages of Shecco Technology compared 
to competing technologies are its greater energy efficiency and lower direct GHG 
emissions during use and at end-of-life disposal. We have chosen, in this report, to focus 
on the tap water heating and MAC applications. All applications, however, have common 
features because they are based on the same patents and CO2 as refrigerant.  
We now turn to a detailed description of the main eco-efficient advantages of the 
Shecco Technology121. First, Shecco Technology reuses CO2, e.g. from ammonia and 
petrochemical plants, that would otherwise probably be emitted. Shecco Technology 
therefore only delays emissions that would otherwise have taken place, but no primary 
production of CO2 is required. Compared to conventional MAC technology based on HFC 
the reuse of CO2 represents an environmental gain because production of HFC 134a also 
implies GHG emissions. According to a representative for DuPont122, one of the world’s 
major producers of HFC, “total production” of one kilogram HFC-134a is estimated to 
emit 8-10 kilograms of CO2-equivalents. Others claim that emissions are as high as 77 kg 
(Campbell and McCulloch 1998). In a MAC suitable for a mid size sedan about half a 
kilogram of HFC is needed. 
Second, another ecological advantage of Shecco Technology is found when comparing 
CO2 MACs to conventional HFC-134a technologies regarding impact during use: leakages 
of CO2 will not pose any additional global warming as the CO2 would have been vented 
anyway. For conventional MACs based on HFC this should not be a problem if they had 
been tight and did not need refill of coolant and if they had an end of lifetime regime. This 
is not the case, however: several tests reveal that there are major leakages of HFC from 
conventional air-conditioning systems in cars. A European Commission (2003) optimistic 
estimate is that direct lifetime emissions from one HFC-driven MAC unit equal 1531 kilos 
of CO2 equivalents. A pessimistic estimate
123 is 3108 kilos of CO2 equivalents during the 
lifetime of a conventional (HFC-134a propellant) mobile air-conditioning unit.  
If HFCs are vented at end of life disposal they cause global warming. In accordance 
with the reasoning above, this is not the case with the CO2 technology. In some countries 
there are regimes and procedures in place for recovery and disposal of HFC at final 
disposal, but most countries do not have such procedures in place at all. Air-conditioning 
                                              
119 The most widely used coolant in mobile air-conditioners is R-134a/HFC-134a. In stationary 
equipment a wide variety of coolants are used. For simplicity’s sake we will only refer to HFC 134a 
in this report. 
120 In this report GWP is measured in accordance with IPCC standards (IPCC 2001) whereby the 
GWP is measured over a  100-year period. This is the same methodology used in the Kyoto 
Agreements. If one measures GWP over 20 years, the GWP of HFC-134a is 3400 times the GWP of 
CO2 (Godal and Fuglestvedt 2002). 
121 In the CondEcol project the technological data are organized in accordance with the eco-design 
wheel. More on this and a more thorough technological presentation of Shecco Technology can be 
found in Ruud and Larsen (2003) and Brekke and Larsen (forthcoming). 
122 E-mail form DuPont representative to the authors dated June 3, 2003. 
123 Implies that the mechanics are not skilled, that there is no recovering and recycling equipment in 
the garages, that the HFC is not recovered at final disposal and so on (EU Commission, 2003). 
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propellant can be recycled, but the available technology is not yet in wide use. Another 
important aspect is that destruction of HFCs requires extremely high temperatures. In 
Norway, decomposing the HFC molecules during the production of cement solves this 
problem124. In other countries, such as Japan, energy-intensive plants are used for the 
decomposing of HFC and CFC. To summarize: to avoid GHG emissions at end-of-life 
disposal conventional heat pump technology requires a regime for recovery of HFC. Even 
if the HFCs are recovered, the destruction process is very energy intensive, and thus 
contributing to global warming. On the contrary, no special infrastructure is necessary to 
avoid GHG emissions when dealing with CO2, either during the service life of units using 
it, or end-of-life disposal. 
By introducing CO2 MACs GHG emissions from production and end-of-life disposal of 
HFC would be eliminated. The numbers might not seem very high at first glance, but 
considering that about 187 million passenger cars were in use in 2002 in the EU alone,125 
and that MAC units are standard equipment in most of the 55 million cars produced 
worldwide annually the total number is significant. Another benefit of CO2 technology is 
that besides reducing direct emissions of GHGs, it also increases energy efficiency. The 
use of air-conditioning in cars causes increased fuel consumption. For example, indirect 
CO2 emissions related to energy use of MACs during a vehicle’s lifetime are a lot higher 
than direct emissions. Tests show that Shecco Technology is more energy efficient than 
conventional MAC systems under normal (outside air) temperature conditions126 and 
equally energy efficient under hot conditions127. The energy consumption referred to above 
is related to the technology’s cooling abilities. But the technology is, due to high operating 
pressures in the systems, also capable of delivering energy-efficient heating. This feature is 
important in modern diesel-powered vehicles because modern energy-efficient diesel 
engines do not produce enough residual heat to warm the passenger compartment. 
Therefore, such vehicles need passenger compartment heating units which, if they use 
Shecco Technology, will be more environmentally friendly. The same would apply to 
future hybrid and fuel cell cars. Therefore, applying Shecco Technology in combined 
heating and cooling units in cars is very environmentally friendly.  
Denso Corporation128 has realized the technology’s heating advantages. In May 2001 
Denso introduced Shecco Technology in tap water heaters in Japan. Japanese use very hot 
water in their homes. Energy to heat water accounts for 35 percent of energy 
consumption in Japan. Prior to Denso Corporation’s breakthrough, no energy-saving 
solutions had been applied to water heating equipment in Japan. Compared to gas-fired129 
water heating systems, the systems using Shecco Technology reduce CO2 emissions by 
50%. Furthermore the Shecco Technology has low operating costs: up to 80% lower 
according to Denso’s claims. 
                                              
124 HFCs are burned together with CFCs at 2000 degrees Celsius. The cement industry needs 
chlorine in the production process; hence their interest in CFCs. HFCs do not contain chlorine. 
However, the cement industry is burning them as a courtesy to environmental interests at the 
present time. 
125 Source: The European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA)  
http://www.acea.be/ACEA/Car_Parc_1995-2002.pdf (Accessed May 2, 2004) 
126 Defined as typical US, Japanese or European climate.  
127 A typical example would be Phoenix, Arizona or Dubai… 
128 http://www.globaldenso.com/en/ (Accessed May 2, 2004) 
129 Methane and LPG. 
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9.1.2 The innovation journey – the short version 
In 1989 Gustav Lorentzen approached Norsk Hydro with what he claimed was a 
solution to environmental problems related to the use of HFCs in heating and cooling 
technology. Norsk Hydro studied his documentation carefully and listened to him. Prof. 
Lorentzen was widely regarded as a guru in his field and Norsk Hydro wisely took him 
seriously. As the presentation of the technology in 9.1.1 above shows, the technology has 
a significant beneficial ecological potential. Norsk Hydro saw this potential.130 They also 
realized that mutual benefits could be exploited between the Shecco Technology and 
Norsk Hydro’s world leading aluminum tube technology, which is used in heat 
exchangers. Hydro also saw the financial potential from the patenting and licensing of 
Lorentzen’s technology. 
Despite all the above, Norsk Hydro had difficulty finding a “home” for Lorentzen’s 
technology in the conglomerate. The gas division could not combine it with their other 
activities due to volume issues, but the aluminium division saw its environmental benefits. 
Moreover, they were already manufacturing aluminium tubes for the MAC industry and 
had the competence to patent Lorentzen’s technology and bring it to market. It was 
decided to pursue a strategy targeting the MAC industry, called MAC2000, aimed at 
having the first MAC units on the road by the turn of the century. The car industry itself 
was searching for solutions to the environmental problems caused by the use of CFC and 
HFC in automobile air-conditioning units. In 1991, collaboration between European car 
manufacturers was launched (RACE) to develop and test CO2 systems for automobile air-
conditioning. The companies participating were BMW, DaimlerBenz, Rover, Volvo, VW, 
Behr, Danfoss, and Valco, and the project received financial support from the EU. By 
1997 the RACE test results were known, and the message was clear: the technology 
worked. Norsk Hydro soon learned, however, that the automobile industry was not 
willing to change rapidly. The costs related to the transition from CFCs to HFCs were one 
stumbling block. Furthermore, the powerful chemical industry had its objections to 
change.  
The first commercial breakthrough came in 2000, but not in the mobile air-
conditioning industry. In 1990, the Denso Corporation, a leading Japanese manufacturer 
of air-conditioning systems for cars, began work on developing new, more energy-efficient 
heat pumps for heating tap water in Tokyo. The company’s attention was drawn to 
SINTEF's successful experiments on the use of CO2 heat pumps. The result was the Eco 
Cute, a small, neat and efficient water heater. The work was done for TEPCO (Tokyo 
Electric Power Company131). A license agreement between Hydro and Denso on heat 
pumps for heating tap water in Japanese homes was signed in 2001. 
9.1.3 Main actors and influences, barriers and drivers 
Norsk Hydro’s involvement in the Shecco technology is founded on worldwide patents 
of the process. As soon as the patent rights were secured, it became evident to the Shecco 
entrepreneurs that the industrial and scientific networks in the heating and cooling 
                                              
130 At the same time Norsk Hydro showed a growing concern for the environment and actually 
published their first “environmental report” in 1989. 
131 More info at URL: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html ((Accessed July 30, 2004) 
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industry were extremely important for the development of the technology, both 
scientifically and financially. A strategy was developed to activate technical and 
commercial alliances. In the early 1990’s Norsk Hydro financed research at SINTEF and 
at The Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Center (ACRC) at the University of Illinois in 
Urbana132. The project in Urbana was very successful, especially because the technology 
through this project “went public” for the first time and was introduced to the worldwide 
research community. Several automobile manufacturers (Ford, Toyota and Daimler 
Chrysler) showed interest in the technology. These automobile manufacturers participated 
in developing the technology by financing both external and in-house research. All these 
efforts snowballed, and it was possible to develop the technology by spreading 
development costs among several actors. This represented a significant driving force in the 
development of the Shecco technology. Furthermore, a commercial network was also 
established to ensure that Hydro could guarantee access to the CO2 technology without 
compromising its relationships with customers in the air-conditioning industry that 
Hydro’s Aluminium Division133 was supplying. SINTEF played a central roll, 
communicating technological details and application ideas to both existing and potential 
customers. 
Norsk Hydro spent about NOK 60 million over a ten-year period to finance the 
development of the patents. This was allocated from the company’s research budgets. 
Norsk Hydro did not apply for additional funding from banks, financial institutions or 
venture funds. It is difficult to estimate the value of the networks and alliances that were 
activated by Hydro. Perhaps thousands of people have been working on projects related 
to the CO2 technology since 1989. 
The main barrier to the introduction and diffusion of Shecco technology to the mobile 
air-conditioning market has been the existing infrastructure which favors the conventional 
technology. When CFCs were regulated through the Montreal Protocol in 1987, the 
chemical industry had already developed HFC 134a as an alternative to CFCs. The switch 
involved costs and therefore the automobile industry has been slow to initiate a voluntary 
change. This could change soon. The EU has proposed legislation that will phase out HFC 
134a by either 2009 or 2011 and totally ban the use of HFC 134a from 2014. In any case, 
the automobile industry will have to adapt to new, more energy-efficient diesel engines, 
hybrids and fuel cell cars requiring more eco-efficient units for heating the passenger 
compartment. Therefore, there is a very large future market for heating applications using 
Shecco Technology. Simultaneously there are significant environmental benefits in terms 
of reduced CO2 emissions from the European car fleet.   
As mentioned above, the water heating applications of the technology were developed 
by Denso Corporation based on license agreements with Shecco. Prior to those license 
agreements, Denso was solely focused on producing automobile auxiliary systems, such as 
MAC units, for the Japanese automobile industry, and had never developed technology for 
other applications such as tap water heating. We do not know much about how Denso 
developed the technology, but it is clear that they somehow applied a MAC heat 
exchanger technology to tap water heating units. Their application of technology from one 
industry to another has created significant opportunities for Denso in the Japanese tap 
water heating market. Denso applied the technology to water heating without any 
                                              
132 http://acrc.me.uiuc.edu/ (Accessed July 17 2003.) 
133 http://www.hydro.com/en/our_business/aluminium/index.html (Accessed July 30, 2004) 
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involvement by Norsk Hydro, but with some assistance from SINTEF. Perhaps this case 
holds significant lessons about how a single technology can be applied to very different 
industries worldwide. 
9.2 ScanWafer 
ScanWafer’s story is very different from Shecco’s. ScanWafer produces silica wafers, 
essential parts in the production of solar energy panels. In response to the question “What 
is the innovation”, Erik Sauar, research director at ScanWafer, responds134 “We make a 
product that is marginally better, but physically identical. It has slightly better crystals, but 
is clearly the same product as those existing before. We have, however, introduced 
important innovations to optimize the production techniques”.  
ScanWafer was established in 1994, but is since 2000 controlled by Renewable Energy 
Corporation (REC), the only company in the world that covers the whole value chain of 
solar energy – from the manufacturing of solar-grade polysilicon feedstock to the 
marketing of photovoltaic (PV) systems to the consumer. By creating technological 
innovations, economies of scale and synergies along the whole value chain, REC offers 
high-performance PV components and systems at market prices which are continuing to 
decline. Their goal is to make solar energy increasingly more competitive, because REC 
believes that competitively priced solar energy is the only long-term answer to the world's 
need for clean, affordable energy. ScanWafer – the focus of this section – is crucial in 
reaching this goal. 
While scientists may disagree on what is causing current climate change and extreme 
weather, nobody is denying that Earth is suffering from the negative impacts of 
environmentally unfriendly energy technology and excessive consumption of energy based 
on fossil fuels. Although technologies for utilizing traditional energy sources are 
continuously being improved, supplies of those sources are strictly limited. Fossil fuels – 
oil, gas and coal – are likely to be depleted in the next few generations. Among the 
renewable energy sources – sun, wind and water – the sun is in some ways the newest to 
be exploited by mankind. While mankind harnessed water and wind power long ago, it 
was only 50 years ago that mankind first succeeded in generating electrical power directly 
from sunlight.  
9.2.1 Eco-efficient technological features 
While Shecco’s main innovation and ecological advantages are related to impact 
during use, ScanWafer’s innovations are related to optimization of production techniques 
and the obvious ecological advantages related to impact during use. According to 
ScanWafer135 the efficiency of multicrystalline wafers has increased by about 25 % from 
1997 to 2003. In the same period the price of wafers has declined about 20% while the 
price of silica raw material has risen 250%, from about 10 USD to 25 USD. This reflects a 
general trend in the industry: fierce competition and a need to innovate along the whole 
value chain in order to survive.  
                                              
134 Telephone interview March 3, 2004. 
135 http://www.scanwafer.com/index.php/4740 (Accessed Feb 23, 2004). 
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Regarding raw materials for the wafers, silica is the main component of a solar cell. 
Solar cells can be made of different materials using different technologies. The 
technologies based on multicrystalline and monocrystalline silica wafers are currently the 
most common, and of all solar cells produced annually, 50% have wafers made of 
multicrystalline silica. ScanWafer only produces multicrystalline silica wafers and the 
company believes that multicrystalline silica is and will continue to be the most cost-
effective material because it is reasonably priced, and allows for the use of a cost-efficient 
production process. The company also believes that this material makes possible further, 
significant cost reductions in the manufacturing process. Furthermore, it believes that the 
energy-producing efficiency of the cells can be increased beyond the current 15.5%.  
Because the cost of wafers constitutes a substantial part of the solar cell’s total cost, 
ScanWafer and its competitors strive to reduce the amount of material used to produce 
each wafer. One of ScanWafer competitive advantages is a specially developed wire saw 
to cut the silica blocks into very thin wafers, about one-third of a millimetre thick, i.e. 330 
microns. REC’s goal is to cut wafers at a thickness of 200 microns by 2010. ScanWafer 
has also introduced recycling of production consumables, which is significant both for its 
environmental impact and its impact on production costs. 
For the solar cell industry, optimization of production techniques poses the main 
challenge to advances in the efficiency of the panels. Improvements are possible across 
the whole production process: purification of solar grade feedstock, melting and 
crystallization of pure silica doped with boron, the cutting of wafers from the 
multicrystalline silica, the surface treatment of the solar cell, and the imprinting of 
electrical contacts on the wafer. It is probably possible to increase the efficiency of the 
solar cells by up to 15%. ScanWafer’s main advantages are a high degree of automation in 
the production process and an efficient furnace for producing ingots, which is the most 
critical part of the process. Regarding the furnace, its main advantage is related to the fact 
that the size of the oven is four times the size of those used by competitors within the PV 
industry. Consequently higher volumes can be produced.  This makes the melting of silica 
into ingots very cost efficient. The modular design of solar energy systems makes solar 
energy suitable for producing energy at the site of its consumption, e.g. roof-top solar 
panels can power a household. Typical installations produce 3-5 kW, which meets the 
energy needs136 of a household. For private homes, the energy could be produced during 
daytime, when the household’s demand for energy is low, but the need for energy is high 
in offices and shops, especially where drifting of AC-units in offices and shops requires 
considerable amounts of energy. This opens up possibilities for systems and infrastructure 
which distribute to the grid surplus energy from rooftop solar panels on private homes. 
With traditional stand-alone solar systems, energy storage would be required, making the 
total system expensive and not very flexible. An integrated system where the excess 
capacity could be supplied to the grid, avoids the need for storage, but requires that the 
local energy system be adapted to such decentralized production. For example, Germany 
has introduced policy instruments to facilitate distribution of solar energy from roof top 
panels to the grid. The program was initiated at a political level137 and guarantees 
                                              
136 This does not apply where electricity is used for heating. 
137 When the Red-Green coalition won the elections in 1999, the Green party demanded subsidies 
for renewable energies to join the government. The coming policies were announced, which lead to 
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households a high fixed price for the energy they supply. The fixed price is as of 2004 0.51 
 per kWh, about four times the current electricity price the household pays for 
“conventional” electricity. In addition, generous loans and subsidies were given to 
households that wanted to install their own roof-top energy plants.138 
In areas where electricity infrastructure is not well developed, stand-alone solar energy 
systems are a viable and cost-effective solution for electricity production. This solution is 
especially interesting in less developed parts of the world where infrastructure for 
electricity supply through a grid is not established. In fact is also the case in the 
Norwegian market segment for supplying electricity to holiday cottages without access to 
the grid. During the 1980s this was the biggest single market for solar panels in the world. 
At that time BP Solar had 25% of its annual sales in Norway, and the sales were 
important for the development of the PV technology. It is further interesting to note that 
solar power was commercialized at this level in Norway long before global warming and 
CO2 emissions became major issues in national and global environmental politics, which 
could be interpreted to illustrate the commercial potential of solar cell technology. 
The main ecological advantages of solar energy are related to the absence of negative 
environmental impacts during the use solar power systems. The eco-effective advantages 
of the PV technology are obvious compared to electricity generation based on fossil fuels: 
Solar panels do not cause any negative environmental impact during use. When solar rays 
hit the panel they are simply converted to electricity by the wafers. A crucial aspect, from 
a life cycle perspective, is the amount of energy used in the manufacturing of solar panels 
in general and wafers in particular. According to the PV industry, pay back time (PBT) to 
recover the cost of the energy used in manufacturing a solar panel is currently estimated 
to be 2-4 years, depending on the amount of sun to which the panel is exposed. Due to 
technological improvements, the PBT has been radically reduced during recent years. 
Considering also that the cost per watt generated by solar energy has been radically 
reduced the last 10 years, the cost of electricity generated by solar energy has become 
increasingly competitive. According to the “Handbook of Photovoltaic Science and 
Engineering” (Hegedus and Luque 2003), the cost per Wp (peak watt) has been reduced 
by about 5 % per year since 1998. According to Erik Sauar, in some parts of the world, 
like Southern Japan, prices of photo voltaic electricity can be as cheap as about 0.22  per 
kWh.139 This price is similar to the price Japanese households pay for electricity delivered 
from conventional, non-renewable sources. 
9.2.2 The innovation journey – the short version 
In the late 1980’s Elkem ASA140, one of the world's leading suppliers of metals and 
materials141, including silica, developed a strategy for selling silica downstream. Alf 
                                                                                                                                         
a total stand still in the PV energy market for about 10 months. Nobody wanted to invest in panels 
when they knew that a subsidy arrangement was coming up. 
138 For more information on this please consult the official “100.000 roofs program” 
http://www.100000daecher.de/ (accessed Feb 23, 2004) and related internet sites. They give an 
overview of much solar energy that can be produced from a rooftop installation and gives a 
calculation of costs related to it. 
139 Prices presuppose 1700 hours of sun annually, an estimated life time of the panel of 50 years and 
5% interest rate on the loan 
140 Consult http://www.elkem.com/ for more information (Accessed May 2, 2004). 
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Bjørseth former R&D director of Elkem, and now chairman of the board of ScanWafer, 
was responsible for the project. Elkem bought Crystallox, a company spun off from 
research projects at Oxford University, and the world-leading producer of furnaces for 
silica smelting. Elkem had considered establishing a multicrystalline silica factory in 
Norway, but with the fall of the wall between East and West Europe in 1989 the market 
was flooded with cheap raw material from the East, and Elkem got into serious financial 
problems. Elkem was forced to cease investments in the segment and Mr Bjørseth left his 
position.  
In 1994 ScanWafer was established by Mr Bjørseth and Reidar Langmo, CEO of 
Meløy Næringsutvikling AS142. Bjørseth had technological competence in the field and a 
vision of Norway as a perfect location for silica wafer production. Glomfjord in Nordland 
County in northern Norway was chosen as the site for a production facility. It offered an 
existing industrial infrastructure, an abundance of inexpensive hydroelectric power, large 
quantities of free cooling water for the production process and an available experienced, 
stable and skilled labour force familiar with shift work on a 24 hour basis.  
ScanWafer later increased its production capacity from 10 MW to more than 70 MW 
by opening a second production line in Glomfjord, and commenced construction of a 
third plant at a new site, Herøya (200km south-south-east of Oslo) in August 2003. 
ScanWafer is now one of the world's biggest suppliers of multicrystalline silicon wafers 
with production totaling around 110 MW at an efficiency rate of 14%. Its expansion is 
going against the trend in manufacturing in Norway, which has experienced a decline in 
industrial employment in recent years. 
9.2.3 Main actors and influences, barriers and drivers 
The similarities with the Shecco case are evident regarding the driving forces behind 
technology development at REC. Champions seemed to be important in both cases. Had 
Mr. Bjørseth not forged ahead despite the difficulties at Elkem, multicrystalline silica 
wafer production would probably never have been started in Norway. While Shecco’s 
innovations resulted from ideas developed by an academic scholar who came to Norsk 
Hydro, ScanWafer’s innovations were driven by champions from within industry.  
However, as in the case of Shecco, success at ScanWafer would not have been realized 
without significant industrial networking involving dedicated personnel in other 
companies. For example: In cooperation with the German company ALD, ScanWafer has 
developed a very effective furnace for the smelting of multicrystalline silicon into blocks. 
In cooperation with Vesuvius143 ScanWafer have developed high-tech ceramic pots for the 
smelting of silicon into ingots. Experts from Mitsubishi, ScanWafer’s biggest customer 
have been working part time at the Glomfjord plants to cut costs in wafer production. 
(The cost of wafers constitutes 50% of the cost of a Mitsubishi solar cell.) In cooperation 
with HCT144, a Swiss company specializing in wire saws which slice the ingots into wafers, 
more efficient saws are being developed. Exclusive deals on the purchase of equipment 
                                                                                                                                         
141 Elkem's main products are ferroalloys, silicon metal, aluminium, carbon and microsilica. 
142 Some more information about Meløy Næringsutvikling is available at 
http://www.meloynett.com/download/www-MNU2003.pdf (Accessed May 3, 2004) 
143 http://www.vesuvius.com (Accessed July 30, 2004) 
144 http://www.hct.ch (Accessed July 30, 2004) 
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from ALD, Vesuvius, and HCT are critical to ScanWafer’s ability to achieve low costs and 
a relatively big share of the market for wafers and emphasize the importance of industrial 
networks for succeeding in the PV-industry. According to Erik Sauar145, R&D manager at 
ScanWafer, these supplier relationships make market penetration by new actors – lacking 
access to exclusive technology – very difficult. 
At start up in 1994, ScanWafer found it difficult to raise funds to build the first 
production line in Glomfjord. Financial support was eventually secured from Meløy 
Næringsutvikling AS, an investment company owned by the Meløy municipality (50 %), 
Norsk Hydro (25 %) and two local banks. Some funding and resources were also 
allocated from SND and SIVA, referred to in chapter 7.2 above. Financing seems to have 
been more difficult for ScanWafer than for Shecco, because ScanWafer had to obtain 
funding from the open market whereas Shecco, to a large degree, could rely on funding 
from Norsk Hydro. ScanWafer has received R&D support from the RCN and some EU 
funding. Erik Sauar states that on many occasions ScanWafer has been offered better 
investment conditions by countries other than Norway – including EU countries such as 
Germany. An example is when ScanWafer decided to set up a new plant at Herøya 
(ScanWafers third plant). Local authorities of the county of Bayern in Southern Germany 
offered ScanWafer investment grants and tax credits. Representatives of SND – now part 
of Innovation Norway – charged that this was in violation of the European Economic 
Treaty (EET). According to Alf Bjørseth,146 German authorities dismissed theses charges. 
ScanWafer eventually decided to locate the factory at Herøya, but this was done without 
the Norwegian government’s support. Norsk Hydro and the major bank in Norway, DnB, 
supported the new production facilities. 
There do not seem to be major hurdles to overcome in developing and market 
introduction of ScanWafer’s technology, unlike the case of Shecco Technology. 
Nevertheless, it has been difficult to raise funds for investments in its three Norwegian 
factories. Despite these difficulties, ScanWafer has become a success story. The company 
has grown into one of the biggest suppliers of multicrystalline wafers in the world. 
ScanWafer has top-of-the-line production equipment, an experienced workforce and 
enjoys a solid market position. 
9.3 To what extent are the two cases impacted by environmental and 
innovation policy integration in Norway? 
It is clear that both Shecco and ScanWafer developed without major financial or other 
support from the Norwegian Government, although SIVA contributed to ScanWafer’s 
first production line in Glomfjord.  
The Shecco case is an example of what is probably a typical innovation processes 
within big Norwegian companies: SINTEF and Norsk Hydro kept the development of 
Shecco Technology secret until the patent application was filed. Then the Shecco team 
did not turn to Norwegian authorities for assistance from SFT’s Program for 
Environmental Technology (see section 7.1.4 above) or SND’s environmental warranties 
program (see section 7.2.3 above), but rather created worldwide research networks on its 
                                              
145 Interview June 26, 2003. 
146 Stated on November 14, 2003 during an innovation conference organized by NHO at Telenor 
EXPO.  
 84 
own. According to Per Døvle at SFT147, they were aware of Shecco’s project, but an 
application for funding was never received. The case illustrates that commercial firms do 
not necessarily seek government assistance as a first recourse when developing new 
technologies.   
In the Shecco case it is definitely a complicating element that the strategy of the 
Shecco team was to try to enter the Mobile Air Conditioning (MAC) market. In retrospect 
this could probably never have been facilitated by the Norwegian authorities anyway, as 
the need for extensive changes in a global industry required efforts on a high and 
concerted political level. There was, however, a meeting in the mid 1990s between the 
team and the Minister of the Environment at the time, Thorbjørn Berntsen. According to 
Mr. Rolf Marstrander148, former research director at Norsk Hydro ASA, the Minister was 
very interested in the project and promised to confer with the German Minister of the 
Environment on the issue, but the Shecco team never received any feedback or follow ups 
from the MoE.  
It is also important to remember that technology development is only the first stage in a 
long innovation journey. Although there was a system in place to finance demonstration 
projects, it was not a recourse sought by the Shecco team. Nevertheless, policy 
instruments for creating a market or finding a niche where the technology can be tested in 
real life (and where production can be cut), is of great importance. This is especially the 
case when the innovation in question is directed at mass production in a market that 
already has accepted alternatives in widespread use, like in the Shecco case: Given the 
prevailing preferences and the complexity of the MAC segment, it could therefore be 
easier to design policy instruments for the commercialization of the CO2 technology in 
other applications such as tap water heating or cooling counters for supermarkets etc. Any 
national authorities should have expertise to evaluate such cases.  
The ScanWafer case is somewhat different. The company has managed to set up three 
production lines providing work places in areas where industrial activity is reduced or 
disbanded. (This reminds us of the importance of including social references beyond 
ecological concerns. Sustainable development is based on three pillars and innovation and 
commercial development is not only related to financial and economic affairs. 
Employment and social change in general is crucial. Our concern, however, is that this 
social change must remain environmentally sound.) The SND and SIVA did contribute to 
the ScanWafer success story, but their contributions were not necessary to that success. 
The Herøya plant was set up despite rather than because of SND. ScanWafer’s success is 
not a result of Norwegian environmental or innovation policies, an certainly not a result 
of integration of the two policy fields. 
 
 
                                              
147 Stated at meeting in MoE, May 5, 2004. 
148 Interview Nov 11, 2002. 
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10 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
By 1997, 159 countries had established national commissions, or other national 
coordinating bodies, on sustainable development. These were initiated in order to develop 
an integrated approach to sustainable development and to include civil society in the 
process of developing strategies and agendas. This was also the case in Norway. In 1990 
the National Committee on Sustainable Development (NCSD) was established. 
According to its mandate, the NCSD was to promote sustainable development by 
integrating environmental concerns into public and private activities. Two of NCSD’s 
other tasks were to build national and international consensus, and to build alliances 
between government, the business sector, trade unions, the research sector, voluntary 
organizations and youth. The mandate was quite vague, and NCSD had considerable 
freedom to decide its own agenda and work (Hovden and Torjussen 2002).  
In the period 1990 – 1993 NCSD held a number of meetings, but there are no records 
of meetings after 1993. Hovden and Torjussen (2002) argue that the poor relationship 
between the government and the environmental movement may have been one of the 
reasons for disbanding NCSD. The former Minister of the Environment, Thorbjørn 
Berntsen has claimed that it was disbanded mainly because business and labour became 
“tired of listening to the doomsday prophecies of the environmental movement” (Hovden 
and Torjussen 2002: 27). Regardless of the reason, it is clear that the visions of integrating 
environmental concerns into public and private activities were not realized. This was also 
the case for integration of environmental and innovation policies. When the resources for 
environmental technology dried up in the late 1990s, the executive officers’ committee 
was dissolved149. The only politically initiated effort that remained was the Environmental 
Fund, under the sole direction of the SND.  
When the government prepared its National Strategy for Sustainable Development 
prior to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 
2002, it was again criticized for not involving non-state actors. Those involved in 
preparatory work for the National Action Plan (NA21) tried to address such criticisms by 
involving various stakeholders in a number of planning meetings, and the resulting action 
plan is quite explicit in calling for a communication platform characterized by 
transparency and public involvement. But it is still unclear as to whether the plan 
promotes policy integration in general and a green innovation policy in particular. The 
findings documented in this report are not very promising in that regard. 
10.1 Findings 
The National Environmental Monitoring System (NEMS) is an innovative exercise in 
policy integration. The system could, if fully operational, be a valuable tool for integrating 
environmental concerns into other policy areas. The bi-annual “State of the Environment” 
                                              
149 According to Emil Jessen, telephone interview May 25, 2004. 
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reports constitute a good basis for following up on environmental policy issues, and 
significant efforts have been made to formulate and publish sectoral Environmental 
Action Plans. As documented, however, the NEMS is not fully operational in accordance 
with the intentions of its founders. The major deficiencies are: a lack of reporting from the 
ministries on their efforts and incomplete work on the Result Documentation System 
(RDS). Further, the sectoral Environmental Action Plans need improvement, especially in 
meeting operational targets in accordance with the eight priority areas.  
The comprehensive innovation policy action plan (HIP) is not really very innovative, 
and in terms of being an action plan, not very comprehensive. This is the case, at least, 
regarding environmental concerns and green innovation. This report documents that the 
HIP contains virtually no references to environmental concerns and does not take the 
ecological thresholds and Earth’s carrying capacity into account. This stands in striking 
contrast to the basic the National Action Plan on Sustainable Development, NA21, in 
which the need for de-coupling is presupposed: Current economic growth trajectories 
cannot be sustained unless environmental concerns are taken into account. Indirectly the 
NA21 emphasizes that sustainable economic development must include a green 
innovation policy. In NA21 it is stated that the HIP “is consistent with NA21” (White 
Paper 1 (2003-2004): Ch 6.5.6), but as shown above: the HIP does not have references to 
environmental issues.   
Further, a check of the directorates and initiatives under the Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry reveals almost no current activities related to 
green innovation. On the contrary, the number of policy instruments related to green 
innovation and environmental technologies have declined significantly since the late 
1980s, a finding that is supported by the evaluation of the most important policy 
documents published by the two ministries over the last 15 years. It is also worth noting 
that the funds for these few initiatives have mainly been provided by the MoE whereas 
MoTI is responsible for the innovation policy. The conclusion is quite clear: there is at 
present no green innovation policy for sustainable development in Norway and no 
integration between environmental and innovation policies. 
  Initiatives by other ministries, such as CO2 taxation, SkatteFUNN and the schemes 
proposed by Enova, may all represent potentially important policy efforts in a green 
innovation context. However, we have very few findings that indicate that this actually is 
the case. Enova has no mandate to get involved in technology development. Its mandate 
is limited to the commercialization of newly innovated energy technologies. SkatteFUNN 
does not involve measures to specifically promote green innovation, and the logic behind 
CO2 taxation assumes that, tax penalties related to specific emissions, will motivate firms 
to change technologies. However, it is beyond the scope of this report to evaluate the 
degree to which financial measures, like the CO2 tax, have actually contributed to the 
development of green innovations. But given that most of the major polluting industries 
have been granted CO2 tax exemptions
150, it is clear that there are few effective incentives 
for reducing such emissions. 
                                              
150 This is not the case for the petroleum industry. 
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10.2 Policy recommendations 
The extensive documentation provided here clearly indicates that there is no 
integration between environmental and innovation policies. Consequently, there is 
currently no such thing as a green innovation policy in Norway. How could this situation 
be changed? 
In accordance with our analytical approach, our first recommendation calls for 
improvement along two dimensions: 
1) Strengthening of horizontal governance 
2) Strengthening of vertical governance.  
In the short term, however, it might be more feasible and realistic to reconsider the 
initiatives documented throughout this report. We will therefore propose a third set of 
policy recommendations related to vertical governance, namely simple alterations of some 
of the existing innovation initiatives: 
3) Facilitating green innovation through existing sectoral policy instruments.  
10.2.1 A strengthening of horizontal governance 
Achieving greater cohesion through horizontal governance means that policy efforts 
must be coordinated and funding allocated. Recalling that there is currently no green 
innovation policy in Norway, a first and very important measure would be to develop a 
Green Innovation Action Plan (GIAP) for Norway that is compatible with other national 
policy efforts such as the National Action Plan for Sustainable Development (NA21) and 
the Plan for a Comprehensive Innovation Policy (HIP). If this is not feasible and 
alternative would be to develop an equivalent to current efforts undertaken in the EU 
with regards to the Environmental Technology Action Plan (ETAP). This would further 
support national efforts to strengthen sustainable development.  
Preparatory work on a plan similar to the EU ETAP has recently been initiated by the 
MoE. We will not propose specific content for such a green innovation action plan. It is 
important, however, that it includes aspects of governance and that it addresses how 
actual activities of, for instance, a greening of industry, could be managed by various 
ministries and directorates. It is further important that an eventual plan be integrated and 
coordinated with other efforts undertaken by the Government to strengthen the national 
innovation policy. 
A central authority specifically entrusted with the supervision, coordination and 
implementation of green innovation policy should be established. The authority should 
primarily be located at a high political level – the Prime Minister’s Office, for example – to 
ensure policy integration, allocation of resources and a stable and long-term commitment 
to the task of promoting green innovation in Norway. Taking into account the political 
realities in Norway, however, an alternative solution would be to strengthen the position 
of the committee coordinating the National Action Plan for Sustainable Development 
(NA21). A strengthening of green innovation should be a crucial and necessary concern of 
a body entrusted with the task of strengthening sustainable development. Consequently, 
the NA21 committee of deputy ministers, which currently has limited its efforts to the 
development of national sustainable development indicators, should be more concerned 
with green innovation governance. (The NA21 committee of deputy ministers includes 
representatives from both MoE and the MoTI, in contrast to a committee of deputy 
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ministers established to promote the HIP, where the MoE is not represented). By 
strengthening governance for green innovation, the NA21 committee could make a 
significant contribution to the strengthening of sustainable development in Norway –
integrating economic, social and ecological improvements. 
As part of these efforts a clear initiative as to sectoral responsibility for overarching 
goals on green innovations should be initiated by the central authorities. Further, 
timetables and targets for green innovation policy should be developed and periodic 
reporting of progress with respect to targets at both the central and sectoral levels should 
be done, preferably in accordance with the NEMS. Finally, it is important to promote an 
active and monitored usage of assessments for all governmental policies related to green 
innovation. This should be a crucial task for the high-level committee entrusted with the 
challenge of horizontal governance. 
10.2.2 A strengthening of vertical governance 
As already indicated, this report has clearly documented that plans are not carried out 
in practice, especially in relation to the NEMS. Furthermore, implementation of several 
plans has not yet even begun. We are, therefore, not convinced that sectoral plans for 
green innovation will show significant improvement in terms of actual practice(s). 
However, as mentioned in the above discussion of horizontal governance, we strongly 
believe that Norway should develop a Green Innovation Action Plan, and that the plan 
should be supervised and enforced at a high political level. Such a central body would, 
however, only be capable of making broad strategic decisions on policy priorities and 
assuming overall responsibility for the efforts. Fulfillment of the actual objectives of a 
green innovation plan also requires vertical, and more “hands on”, governance initiatives.  
This “hands on” coordination could be achieved by establishing a green innovation 
committee consisting of public servants from relevant ministries and directorates, but with 
wider participation than the former executive officers committee referred to in chapter 
7.2.3 above. Acting as a clearing house and coordinating body for the policy instruments 
in use, it should be capable of covering the whole innovation chain from invention to 
diffusion, and it could build up valuable expertise and experience on green innovations. It 
is important that the group operate with transparency and predictability, and – most 
crucially – with long-term financial and other resources at its disposal. The committee 
should also involve some sort of stakeholder management, and act as a secretariat, forum 
and meeting place for discussing, presenting and getting feed-back on actual green 
innovative efforts taking place in society. Acknowledging that innovation is not a linear 
process, there must be guidelines and goals, but also considerable room for creativity and 
unorthodox ideas and solutions.  
A green innovation policy plan with central government responsibility for coordination 
and control could more effectively make use of financial, organizational, technological 
and human resources in the search for both development and diffusion of green 
innovation towards sustainable development. This could enable a strengthening of vertical 
governance, not only through new policy efforts but also with reference to already existing 
policy instruments. 
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10.2.3 Facilitating green innovation through existing policy instruments 
If one is willing to accept that there are major global and local environmental 
challenges that need to be solved, and that innovation may be a part of the solution, it is, 
in our view, possible to alter some of the innovation-related policy instruments already in 
use. Given current policy instruments, a general recommendation would be that all 
directorates and initiatives described in the current report aim to increase the integration 
of environmental concerns in their daily activities related to innovation.  
It should further be expected that Innovation Norway treat environmental concerns 
seriously and publish a strategy that promotes green innovation. In a European context it 
would be strange indeed if a state initiative like Innovation Norway did not take into 
account environmental concerns in their strategic plans and actual practices. Nevertheless 
at the moment they do not seem to take them into account. Argentum and SIVA should 
also be expected, to a greater extent, to take environmental concerns into account in their 
activities.  
ENOVA is set up by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy to contribute to 
environmentally sound and rational use and production of energy. ENOVA is currently 
focusing on the commercialization of new renewable energy technologies, but could, with 
its extensive financial resources, also be a significant actor promoting green innovation 
and green technology development.  
A more specific example would be SkatteFUNN. Here between 18 and 20 per cent of 
costs related to company R&D activities is reimbursed as tax deductions. It would be 
possible to increase the rate of deductions by, for example, 5 or 10 per cent if 
environmental improvements could be documented. This would be a relatively cheap 
alteration of an existing instrument and it would show that there is political will to reward 
those who want to improve existing products, or develop new products that are more 
environmentally sound. Such an increase in tax deductions would encourage companies 
to promote environmentally sound solutions, and to focus their research and development 
in a more sustainable direction. The Pollution Control Authority should be able to verify 
actual improvements in these areas. If companies choose not to seek extra tax deductions 
by developing environmentally friendly solutions, the scheme will not imply extra costs for 
the government.  
Finally, we note that the Green Government arrangements are to be integrated in all 
government operations in Norway, so that by the end of 2005 all national government 
institutions will have environmental management as an integral part of their management 
systems. A special focus on state procurement is to be used to facilitate a domestic market 
for environmentally friendly products and innovations. A challenging step on most 
innovation journeys is to take the crucial leap from “prototype” to “mass production”. If 
the state acted in a more environmentally responsible way, it could also insist that 
environmentally friendly solutions be sought more frequently. This would be instrumental 
in creating markets for green innovations – a very important step related to diffusion – 
and would also reduce commercial risk. With reference to the Shecco case presented 
above, for example, it would be of great importance if all state institutions stipulated 
stronger standards for eco-friendly cooling devises in public tenders. 
 
The above mentioned examples can be easily extended. Efforts must, however, be 
supported, coordinated and enforced by the proposed committee of deputy ministers, and 
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should be directly embedded in the national efforts for strengthening sustainable 
development – NA21. We recognize, however, that achieving policy coherence is 
complicated and requires time, dedication and will. The ultimate question is whether and 
to what extent political will exists in the specific ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office 
to integrate environmental and innovation policies in Norway. As long as political will is 
lacking, national efforts for promoting green innovations will remain insufficient, and 
national policies for achieving sustainable development will lack a highly relevant and 
broadly applicable instrument for change. 
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